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ABSTRACT 
 
Modeling Dynamics of Post Disaster Recovery. (August 2011) 
Ali Nejat, B.S., Zanjan University, Zanjan, Iran; 
M.S., Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Ivan Damnjanovic 
 
Natural disasters result in loss of lives, damage to built facilities, and interruption of 
businesses. The losses are not instantaneous, but rather continue to occur until the 
community is restored to a functional socio-economic entity. Hence, it is essential that 
policy makers recognize this dynamic aspect of the losses incurred and make realistic 
plans to enhance recovery. However, this cannot take place without understanding how 
homeowners react to recovery signals. These signals can come in different ways: from 
policy makers showing their strong commitment to restore the community by providing 
financial support and/or restoration of lifeline infrastructure; or from the neighbors 
showing their willingness to reconstruct. The goal of this research is to develop a model 
that can account for homeowners’ dynamic interactions in both organizational and 
spatial domains. The spatial domain of interaction focuses on how homeowners process 
signals from the environment, such as neighbors reconstructing and local agencies 
restoring infrastructure, while the organizational domain of interaction focuses on how 
agents process signals from other stakeholders that do not directly affect the 
environment like insurers do. The hypothesis of this study is that these interactions 
iv 
significantly influence decisions to reconstruct and stay, or sell and leave. A multi-agent 
framework is used to capture emergent behavior such as spatial patterns and formation 
of clusters. The developed framework is illustrated and validated using experimental 
data sets. The results from simulation model confirm that spatial and organizational 
externalities play an important role in agents’ decision-making and can greatly impact 
the recovery process. The results further highlight the significant impact of discount 
factor and the accuracy of the signals on the percentage of reconstruction. Finally, 
cluster formation was shown to be an emergent phenomenon during the recovery process 
and spatial modeling technique demonstrated a significantly higher impact on formation 
of clusters in comparison with experimental model and hybrid model. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. PROBLEM STATEMENT1 
Pre-disaster planning is the key to effective recovery from natural catastrophes, such as 
hurricanes, earthquakes, and tsunamis, or human-induced events such as acts of 
terrorism or accidents. In anticipation of these high-impact low-probability events, 
communities and their public and business decision-makers need policies, contingency 
plans, procedures, and guidelines to implement recovery actions. Typically these actions 
include evaluations of damage, removal of debris, and restoration of essential 
infrastructure and services to then allow for a market-driven reconstruction of homes and 
businesses.  
In late summer of 2005, two major storms tested the ability of coastal 
communities in the United States to achieve recovery goals. Hurricane Katrina, and a 
few weeks later Hurricane Rita, exposed the flaws and deficiencies in the existing 
policies, plans and budgets to meaningfully and quickly restore damaged infrastructure 
and promote residential and business reconstruction. The scenes of damaged and 
unserviceable buildings and even entire neighborhoods in New Orleans and other gulf 
coast communities are constant reminders that the disaster is not over until the people 
have returned, and the affected area has been restored to a functioning social, political 
and economic entity. 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of Natural Hazards Review, ASCE. 
2 
 
Following the extensive media coverage, government agencies and the academic 
community have initiated a number of studies to identify hazard-specific design 
deficiencies, develop more effective emergency and evacuation plans, predict the extent 
of structural damage, assess short-term recovery efforts, and model long-term economic 
effects of market-driven reconstruction. However, very few studies, if any, have focused 
on identifying the forces driving such long-term market-driven reconstruction.  
 
1.2. DISSERTATION GOAL 
The goal of this dissertation is to study how agents (i.e. homeowners) process signals 
from spatial and organizational environment during long-term market-driven recovery. 
A successful modeling effort requires capturing agents’ behavior as well as dynamics of 
their interactions over extended period of time. Although there are research efforts on 
modeling the recovery process, they fail to capture the complexity of interactions among 
the agents in a multi-domain environment (i.e. spatial as well as organizational).  
There are a number of beneficiaries of this research. Public officials can use the 
developed models to evaluate recovery plans and strategically “seed” the reconstruction 
efforts in areas that can maximize the speed of recovery. Transportation agencies can use 
the model to evaluate effectiveness of restoration dynamics, while regulatory agencies 
can use it to increase bargaining power of homeowners following the disaster. 
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1.3. SCOPE 
The scope of this research is limited to modeling behavior of two key stakeholders: 
homeowners, agents seeking to rebuild; and insurers, agents that maximize short-and 
long-term utility. The scope indirectly includes public agencies as they control many 
parallel parameters. Even though this assumption constrains the real life application of 
the developed model, it allows for marginal assessment of the effects of spatial and 
organizational externalities on the recovery process. Note that the models do not attempt 
to fully explain a very complex post-disaster reconstruction process, nor heterogeneity in 
homeowners’ behavior, but to provide a theoretical foundation for investigating the 
emergent spatial phenomenon (i.e. clusters) and decision-making under uncertainty. 
 
1.4. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
This subsection presents research objectives formulated as research questions. The 
research questions have been divided into two categories: 1) micro-level research 
questions, and 2) macro-level research questions. The former category focuses on how 
the agents interact in both spatial and organizational domain respectively, while the latter 
category focuses on how such micro-level behaviors affect macro-level phenomena such 
as spatial cluster formation. 
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1.4.1. Micro-level Research Questions 
 
1.4.1.1. RQ1: How do the agents interact in the spatial domain? 
The first micro-level objective of this research is solely focused on how agents make 
decisions in a spatial environment. In other words, this question aims to capture how an 
individual reconstruction decision-making is affected by its neighbors’ decision-making. 
The solution to this question unveils the logic behind how agents’ update their beliefs 
regarding the value of reconstruction given what they observe in the neighborhood. 
Data Source: The dataset used to address this question comes from an 
experimental study conducted in Fall 2010 in the department of Civil Engineering at 
Texas A&M University. Study participants were the students of a junior-level civil 
engineering course. The participants were faced with similar conditions as homeowners 
in affected area would face after a disaster and were asked to choose among different 
strategies. 
Research Method: The methodology proposed for this research question is based 
on a two-pronged approach. In the first theoretical approach, homeowners make 
decisions based on their updated beliefs about their spatial surroundings. As 
reconstruction unfolds, they update their beliefs accordingly. This process is captured 
using Bayesian statistics. The outcome of the first approach is a closed-form theoretical 
solution to the probability of reconstruction.  
The goal in the second approach is to develop and estimate an empirical model 
using previously defined datasets. The outcome of the second approach is a multinomial 
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logistic regression model to predict the probability of reconstruction. The reason behind 
having two approaches is to cover the different aspects of spatial interactions 
independently. In the first theoretical approach, the focus is only on the temporal aspect 
of spatial interactions, which is solely based on assessment of how agents’ actions (i.e. 
neighbors reconstruction actions), influence the dynamics of reconstruction-value in the 
affected area. On the other hand, the second approach aims to capture broader effects 
than just neighbors’ reconstruction decision. The empirical model is developed to 
capture the confluence of different spatial parameters such as availability of 
infrastructure.  
Model Validation: The results from both models are tested for their capability of 
delivering logically expected results.  
 
1.4.1.2. RQ2: How do the agents interact in the organizational domain? 
This research question aims to investigate how market conditions, government 
regulation, and incentives affect the ability of homeowners to secure equitable treatment 
when negotiating with large for-profit institutions such as insurers. In other words, the 
objective is to investigate how agents’ risk attitudes affect their financial negotiations 
with insurers. There is ample anecdotal evidence of price gouging and failure to pay 
claims by some insurers after natural disasters. Indeed, it is not surprising for one party 
to leverage a stronger bargaining position to take advantage of the reduced bargaining 
strength of the other party (e.g. homeowners seeking to rebuild).  Thus, in the second 
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proposed domain of interactions (organizational domain), the bargaining power of the 
“stressed” agents is studied.  
Data Source: The dataset used to address this research question is based on a 
bargaining experiment that was conducted in Fall 2010 in the department of Civil 
Engineering at Texas A&M University. Like in the previous experiment, study 
participants were the students of a junior-level civil engineering course. The 
experimental bargaining scenario mimicked what might happen after disaster between 
homeowners and insurers. Participants were divided into two categories (homeowners 
and insurers), and were asked to choose from the available options in respond to a 
received offer.  
Research Method: Much like the methodology used for RQ1, the proposed 
approach to address this research question is two-fold: theoretical and empirical. In the 
theoretical part, the bargaining problem is modeled based on the concepts of the 
bargaining theory. In the empirical model, the approach to the bargaining problem is 
based on analyzing the collected data from the experiment.  
Model Validation: The results from both models are tested to check for their 
capability of delivering logically expected results.  
 
1.4.2. Macro-level Research Question 
After separately investigating agents’ interaction in both spatial and organizational 
domains, an integrative framework is designed to capture the effects of agents’ behavior 
at a macro-level. This integrative framework is based on a multi-agent system (MAS) 
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simulation approach. There are a number of advantages associated with applications of 
agent-based modeling technique, which make it a desirable approach to address the 
macro-level research question. These benefits include: 1) the ability to tackle the 
complexity of the research problem, 2) ability to capture the dynamics of the system 
during the simulation period, and 3) ability to test different behavioral models. 
 
1.4.2.1. RQ3: Does the spatial interaction of agents result in formation of clusters of 
reconstructed properties?  
The macro-level objective of this dissertation is to detect for any emergent phenomena 
such as spatial cluster formation due to agents’ interactions. Spatial data suggest that 
reconstruction, much like other neighborhood phenomena such as foreclosures, is 
contagious and is nucleated first in small neighborhood areas.  
Research Method: For this research question the methodology includes the 
following steps: 1) developing a MAS model, 2) detecting spatial clusters in MAS model 
using clustering algorithms, 3) hypothesis testing to determine the significance of the 
results from the second step, and 4) contrasting the results from theoretical and empirical 
spatial models to check for the factors that have the most significant influence on the 
formation of clusters. 
 
1.5. ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION 
Section 2 outlines the existing literature on modeling disasters. The section starts with 
introducing loss models and then proceeds to cover the literature on recovery models. 
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The section then continues to highlight the existing gap in the literature and is concluded 
by an introduction on the approach to overcome the shortcomings.  
Section 3 introduces the research methodology to address the objectives of this 
dissertation. It starts with a discussion on the general framework and is further extended 
to capture the multi-domain framework of interactions and experimental data sets 
characteristics.  
Section 4 covers the modeling procedure for the spatial domain of interactions. It 
starts with a discussion on the theoretical model and its solution. To follow, the section 
proceeds with the empirical model formulations and is continued by its associated 
statistical analysis. To conclude, summary of findings is presented.  
Section 5 captures the modeling of the organizational domain of interactions. It 
begins with the theoretical model and proceeds to derive the solution. The section then 
continues with an introduction on empirical model formulation, parameter estimation 
and its associated statistical analysis. It then concludes by the summary of findings.   
Section 6 extends on multi-domain MAS model. It starts with an introduction on 
MAS models, and their specifications. To follow, the simulation setups are discussed 
which are then followed by simulation results, research hypotheses, and testing methods. 
The section ends with a discussion of the results, which is continued by summary of the 
findings.  
Finally, Section 7 outlines the summary of the dissertation, which is then 
proceeded by the areas requiring future research.    
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This section outlines the existing literature on the broad subject of disaster modeling. 
More specifically, the literature review is categorized into two typical modeling areas: 1) 
loss modeling, and 2) recovery modeling. To conclude, the section captures the need and 
the research problem listed as the objectives of this dissertation.  
  
2.1. DISASTER MODELING 
In the literature of disaster modeling, hazard is the incident of the physical occurrence 
whereas disaster is the subsequent aftermath Okuyama and Chang (2004). The studies on 
the impact of natural hazards on the socio-economic condition of affected areas gained 
significant attention due to a series of disasters which took place during the mid 1990s 
such as Northridge earthquake in 1994 and Great Hanshin (Kobe) earthquake in 1995 
(Okuyama, 2007). These events followed by more recent catastrophes such as hurricane 
Katrina in 2005 and hurricane Ike in 2008 highlight the vulnerability of the urban 
infrastructure in modern cities and support the need for a better understanding of 
multidimensional socio-economic impacts and the way the homeowners and public 
sector respond.  
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Economic losses from both natural and anthropogenic disasters do not take place 
instantly; rather they are accumulated over the time of recovery. This implies that to 
assess the scale of losses, it does not suffice just to incorporate the initial losses. In other 
words, the direct losses can trigger spillover effects which in turn can cause indirect 
losses that are as significant, if not more, than the initial losses. In such settings, the 
dynamics of post disaster recovery plays an important role. This is clearly shown in 
Figure 2-1 where three different disaster cases are compared to each other (Chang and 
Miles, 2004). It is assumed that in all the three cases the economy faces a significant 
initial loss due to the occurrence of the disaster. In Case A, the reconstruction stimulus 
has led the economic equilibrium to a curve which dominates the baseline. This indicates 
future potential gains in the long run that will reimburse the initial losses. On the other 
hand, Case C shows that the trend has come to equilibrium below the base line which 
denotes that the reconstruction stimulus was not able to compensate the losses. In case 
B, the economy has a short-term updrift before it converges to the baseline. Figure 2-1 
illustrates how application of different policies during the recovery process can affect the 
magnitude of the total losses. 
11 
 
 
Figure 2-1. Post-disaster recovery adapted from Chang and Miles (2004) 
The economic impacts of natural disasters can be categorized into two major 
categories, which are 1) direct losses, and 2) indirect losses. Differentiating between 
these two terms has been a matter of controversy in the existing literature. While 
Applied Technology Council (1991) and Heinz Center (2000) defined direct losses as 
property damages and indirect losses as business disruptions, Albala-Bertrand (1993) 
characterized indirect losses as a possibility rather than a reality, and Cochrane (2004) 
classified indirect losses as those which are not directly caused by a disaster. Rose et al. 
(1997), defined direct losses as those which incorporate property damage together with 
its following interruptions to directly affected businesses, and indirect losses as those 
12 
 
which are associated with disruptions in businesses that are not directly influenced by a 
disaster. Rose (2004) proposed the use of “higher-order effects” term as an alternative to 
indirect effects to avoid the conflict with other economic modeling terminology 
especially input-output (I/O) models. The term was intended to encompass both input-
output interdependencies and general equilibrium effects which can be attributed to price 
changes in product markets.  
Therefore direct losses can be classified as those that are attributed to the 
damages and destructions to built environment, infrastructure, lifelines, and economic 
sectors and inter-industry linkages. Indirect losses, on the other hand, represent losses 
which are associated with the disturbances caused by the direct losses in economic 
sectors that are not directly affected. This includes the imposed interruptions in 
economic activities such as reductions in supply and demand. In other words, indirect 
losses can be described as a byproduct of the direct losses. Models with a focus on 
incorporating economic losses are represented as loss models whereas those which are 
centered around integrating parameters that affect recovery time path are denoted as 
recovery models. These two models are elaborated in the following subsections. 
 
2.1.1. Loss Modeling 
Loss models focus on capturing the initial losses rather than incorporating the dynamics 
of a recovery process (Chang and Miles, 2004). There are a variety of classifications for 
loss models in the literature. Brookshire et al. (1997) categorized direct loss estimation 
methods into two categories which are: 1) loss estimation based on primary data such as 
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surveys in the affected areas, and 2) loss estimation founded on secondary data such as 
insurance claims, and loans and highlighted their weak prognostic aptitude. Furthermore, 
in the context of loss modeling, input-output (I/O) models are the most prevalent and 
dominating modeling framework to capture the regional economic impacts and higher-
order effects of disasters (Rose 2004). I/O models are linear models which integrate the 
sales and purchases in different segments of an affected economy. I/O models can 
exhibit the interdependency of economic activities and economic sectors including 
producers and/or consumer (Brookshire et al. 1997). This ability makes I/O models a 
good candidate to study the domino effects caused by a disruption in an economic sector. 
Furthermore, the simplicity of I/O models allows integrating engineering models to 
estimate the higher-order effects of a disaster (Okuyama, 2007).  
For example, Gordon and Richardson (1996), Gordon et al. (2004), Choe et al. 
(2001), and Sohn et al. (2004) used the I/O modeling approach to study transportation 
impacts, while Rose (1981), Rose et al. (1997), Rose and Benavides (1993, 1998) 
applied this model to assess lifeline impacts. Furthermore Cochrane et al. (1997), and 
Hewnigs and Mahindhara (1996) applied I/O models to capture the overall impacts of a 
disaster whereas Rose et al. (1997), Cole (1998), and Rose and Benavides (1999) applied 
I/O models to optimize recovery.  
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To overcome the limitations of I/O models such as their linear and rigid 
structure, and lack of resource constraints (Okuyama, 2007), more complex models have 
been developed by Boisvert (1992), Cochrane (1997), Davis and Salkin (1984).   
In addition to traditional I/O models, econometric models are also used to capture 
losses. The econometric models are statistically rigorous, data-intensive, and capable of 
forecasting post-disaster conditions. Moreover, they fall short of differentiating between 
direct and high-order impacts (Rose, 2004). The third alternative to I/O models is 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model. CGE models represent optimized 
behavior of consumers and firms in response to price changes in a multi-market 
framework (Rose 2004). These models can be seen through the works of Boisvert 
(1992), Brookeshire and Mckee (1992), Rose and Guha (2004), and Rose and Liao 
(2005). In contrast to I/O models, CGE models are non-linear, less rigid and capable of 
incorporating supply constraints. In most CGE models, the basis is founded on an 
extended I/O tables to account for separate institutional factors (Rose 2004). This 
includes Social Accounting Matrices to represent the higher order effects (Cole 1995; 
1998; 2004). A summary of these methods together with their strength and weakness 
was summarized by Okuyama (2011) and is shown in Table 2-1. 
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Table 2-1. Summary of more comprehensive loss models with their associated strengths 
and weaknesses adapted from Okuyama (2011) 
Model Strengths Weaknesses 
IO models 
 simple structure 
 detailed inter-industry linkages 
 wide range of analytical 
techniques available 
 easily modified and integrated 
with other models 
 linear structure 
 rigid coefficients 
 no supply capacity constraint 
 no response to price change 
 overestimation of impact 
SAM models 
 more detailed interdependency 
among activities, factors, and 
institutions 
 wide range of analytical 
techniques available 
 used widely for development 
studies 
 linear structure 
 rigid coefficients 
 no supply capacity constraint 
 no response to price change 
 data requirement 
 overestimation of impact 
 
CGE models 
 non-linear structure 
 able to respond to price change 
 able to cooperate with 
substitution 
 able to handle supply capacity 
constraint 
 too flexible to handle 
changes 
 data requirement and 
calibration 
 optimization behavior under 
disaster 
 underestimation of impact 
Econometric 
models 
 statistically rigorous 
 stochastic estimate 
 able to forecast over time 
 data requirement (time series 
and cross section) 
 total impact rather than 
direct and higher-order 
impacts distinguished 
 
Although this subsection briefly outlined the most comprehensive methodologies 
to estimate losses, there are additional studies aimed to capture the shortcomings of these 
methodologies. These efforts include: 1) studies performed by Cole (1988, 1989) and 
Okuyama et al. (2004) to capture the temporal aspect of recovery by introducing a 
disrupted expenditure structure and sequential inter-industry model respectively, 2) 
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studies performed to incorporate the spatial impact of disasters such as an interregional 
IO structure to assess higher order effect such as Okuyama (1999) and Sohn et al. 
(2004), and 3) studies by Rose and Liao (2005), Tierney (1997), Okuyama et al. (1999) 
to capture the behavioral changes due to disasters (Okuyama 2007). 
 
2.1.2. Recovery Modeling 
Despite the substantial literature on post-disaster loss modeling, only few studies (in 
relative terms) have focused on the dynamics of recovery (Chang and Miles 2004). The 
existing literature on modeling the recovery process can be grouped into five major 
categories: 1) Studies with a focus on recovery as a temporal process: This includes 
modeling temporal aspect of factory closure (Cole 1988 1989), interregional input-
output analysis (Okuyama et al. 2004), as well as recovery optimization by minimizing 
economic losses (Rose et al. 1997), 2) Studies founded on a conceptual recovery 
framework introduced by Haas et al. (1977) in which the recovery process was modeled 
as a four-stage sequential incident. This study was followed by case studies by Hogg 
(1980), Rubin and Popkin (1990), Rubin (1991), Berke et al. (1993), and Bolin (1993) 
which extensively questioned this four-stage sequential approach to recovery, its 
predictability, and argued that the order of the sequence can be different from what was 
suggested by Haas et al. (1977). These subsequent studies characterized recovery as an 
uncertain event affected by social disparities and decision-making, 3) Studies centered 
around disparities in recovery, which were pursued by a two-pronged effort. The first 
effort captured disparity in social classes among people (see Hewitt (1997), Blaikie 
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(1994)), where the second effort covered the recovery issues associated with disparities 
in businesses (see Durkin (1984), Kroll et al. (1991) Tierney and Dalhamer (1998), and 
Alesch and Holly (1998)), 4) Studies attempted to capture the effect of spatial externality 
on different aspects of disaster recovery. Among those the spatial impact of lifeline 
infrastructure was studied by Gordon et al. (1998), while Chang and Miles (2004) 
proposed an object modeling technique to capture interactions between industry sectors 
and community planning, and finally 5) Studies to determine the key performance 
measures and indicators to capture the different aspects of the recovery process. These 
include psychological or perceptional measures related to stress and frustration, to more 
objective indicators such as regaining income, employment, household assets, and 
household amenities (Bates 1982, 1993, 1994; Bolin and Bolton, 1983; Bolin and 
Trainer, 1978; Peacock et al., 1987). 
 
2.2. RESEARCH PROBLEM 
While these efforts captured different aspects of the problem, an integrative spatial-
organizational agent-based model is still missing. An example of the existing literature 
on modeling the recovery process through an agent-based approach is the model 
presented by Chang and Miles (2004). Although the model is agent-based, the agents do 
not exist spatially. Hence, this research aims to develop a theoretical link between the 
existing efforts in modeling recovery with a focus on macro-level patterns and socio-
economic impact and those that are aimed at modeling micro-level behavior of 
“stressed” agents. This integration will be conducted in a multi-agent system simulation 
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environment to capture the effects of time and the emergent system behavior. In other 
words, the proposed model can capture 1) the behavior of homeowners in the presence 
of spatial externality (being located among other homeowners), 2) the behavior of 
homeowners while bargaining with high-marketing-power entities such as insurers under 
stressed conditions and 3) the sensitivity of these two types of behaviors to a variety of 
parameters such as availability of infrastructure, and market conditions. 
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3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. GENERAL FRAMEWORK 
Capturing the complexity of homeowners’ multi-domain interactions requires an 
integrative framework, which should allow for flexibility of separately modeling 
domain-specific interactions, while providing a means to account for cross-domain 
phenomena. Multi-agent system (MAS) simulation framework facilitates this process by 
integrating the behaviors of participating agents in two different domains. In addition, it 
provides a framework where temporal and behavioral phenomena from interactions such 
as cluster formation and reduced bargaining power of “stressed agents” can be observed.  
Furthermore, the multi-agent framework also addresses the shortcoming of the 
previous studies in modeling a real spatial environment by assigning a precise location to 
each of the agents in the spatial environment. Therefore, the research approach used in 
this dissertation is based on a series of overlapping steps which are: 1) developing 
theoretical and empirical models to account for spatial aspect, 2) developing theoretical 
and empirical approach to account for bargaining situation, 3) developing integrative 
MAS model, 4) incorporating spatial and organizational behavior among the agents, and 
5) observing the spatial phenomena such as cluster formation. These steps are shown in 
Figure 3-1.  
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Figure 3-1. Research approach 
As shown in the figure, for each of the spatial and organizational domains, two 
types of models are defined; theoretical and empirical. Each of these models can be 
separately chosen to model agents’ interactions. This is called a pure strategy. On the 
other hand if agents’ interactions is believed to be a consequence of the confluence of 
both models, one can assign different weights to each model and constitute a hybrid 
model. The most important advantage of this feature is its ability to simulate a variety of 
behaviors based on agents’ rationality and their different decision making parameters.  In 
spatial domain, one set of parameters captures the temporal aspect of spatial interactions 
whereas the other set covers the situational aspect of this interaction. Similarly, in the 
organizational domain, the first set of factors represents agents’ negotiation based on the 
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theoretical model while the other set of parameters capture a more realistic bargaining 
behavior of agents and is based on the empirical model.   
 
3.2. MULTI-DOMAIN INTERACTIONS 
In this dissertation, the Multi-domain Multi-agent system (MD-MAS) model is illustrated 
in Figure 3-2 as a 3-dimensional representation of the interaction domains. The two 
interaction domains are: 1) spatial domain of interaction among the agents defined by 
their spatial position (e.g. multi-layered networks of residential and commercial 
properties, as well as different infrastructure systems including essential lifelines, such 
as transportation, water, and electric power, and other more indirect yet still very 
important systems such as schools, hospitals, and others); and 2) organizational domain 
of interaction defining logical relationships among the stakeholders at the micro-social 
level. As shown in the figure, the key micro-social organizational agents are 
homeowners and insurers. While this list can be expanded to include other important 
stakeholders, this research is guided by the principle of parsimony, in which the 
complexity of model specification is determined by its predictive capability. In the MD-
MAS model, R represents a homeowner (homeowner), and I characterizes an insurer. 
Following a disaster, homeowners decide about reconstruction of their property based on 
the availability of resources coming from the insurer and/or the governing authorities, 
while observing the actions of other homeowners.  
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Figure 3-2. Interactions in multi-domain environment 
As shown in the figure, two major parameters drive homeowners’ actions 
regarding reconstruction. The first is homeowners’ decision making structure which can 
be either theoretical (based on agents rationality) or empirical and the second is 
homeowners’ perception of environment. Both of these factors are dynamic. The 
interaction starts at time zero when there is no reconstruction in the environment. Figure 
3-2 shows the sequence of steps in the MD-MAS model. At Step 1, agents’ decision-
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making structure is formed which leads to the corresponding actions in Step 2. Step 3 
shows the effect of agents’ actions on the environment and vice versa. Finally, in Step 4, 
the outcomes of these iterative interactions over time are discovered. These outcomes 
can be divided into two categories, which are 1) rate of reconstruction, and 2) spatial 
recovery patterns.  
 
3.3. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
As stated before, the empirical model formulation was based on the experiments. The 
experiments in this dissertation were conducted in the form of surveys. Participants in 
these surveys were chosen from a class of a CVEN junior level course in Zachry 
Department of Civil Engineering, Texas A&M University. To preserve anonymity, 
participants were asked to just communicate with the principal investigator through 
emails. Proper care was taken to make sure that the identity of participants was kept 
confidential and was not disclosed to any other participant. All the steps in the 
experiments were taken by using emails between participants and principal investigator. 
In other words where applicable, the principal investigator played the role of a proxy 
between two interacting participants. Details regarding each of the experiments are 
presented below. 
 
3.3.1. Spatial Interactions Experimental Setup 
In this experiment, the participants were asked to select a reconstruction strategy under 
various overriding spatial and financial settings. Spatial configurations were governed by 
24 
 
the availability of infrastructure and the severity of damages. These configurations 
resulted in 6 different scenarios. Financial viability of reconstruction was controlled by 
the rate of availability of the funds and the cost of reconstruction. The available 
reconstruction strategies were 1) reconstruct immediately, 2) wait for 6 months and 
observe neighbors’ actions and decide accordingly and 3) take insurance money and buy 
a housing alternative somewhere else in town. In this survey, 80 students participated. 
Details regarding the survey together with instructions to participants are included in 
Appendix A. 
 
3.3.2. Bargaining Situation Experimental Setup 
In this experiment, the students were divided into two groups and each group was 
assigned a different role. The first group played the role of insurer while the second 
participated as clients. Clients were supposed to maximize their claims while insurers 
tended to minimize their losses. A total of 77 students participated in the experiment. Six 
of the participants were assigned the role of insurer. Each of the insurers was responsible 
for 10 to 12 clients. This was performed to differentiate the participants from each other 
based on their attitude toward risk. Since insurers have the option of diversifying their 
risk through multiple clients, they were assumed to be risk neutral. The clients on the 
other hand, not having such an option, were assumed to be risk averse. Identity of clients 
was kept confidential and transmission of information between the insurers and the 
clients were managed through the proxy of the principal investigator.   
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3.4. SUMMARY 
The objective of this section was to elaborate on the general framework of this 
dissertation and explain the methodology to approach its goals. The following chapters 
will sequentially complement this section by each focusing on a specific research 
question.   
Section 4, starts with the micro-level objectives of this dissertation by focusing 
on the spatial domain and tackling agents interactions with each other. Furthermore, 
Section 5 expands on the micro-level objectives by capturing the organizational domain 
and addressing the interactions between homeowners and insurers. To continue, Section 
6 elaborates on developing an integrative multi-domain agent based model that can 
incorporate the outcomes from Section 4 and Section 5. This integrative model is used to 
address the macro-level objective of this dissertation by looking for any emergent 
phenomena such as formation of clusters. Finally Section 7 presents the summary of 
findings and highlights the issues require future research. 
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4. MODELING SPATIAL INTERACTIONS 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
This section presents the first micro-level objective of this dissertation by providing the 
answer to the question: “How agents process the information from the neighborhood?” 
The section starts with a presentation of a theoretical model in which the homeowners 
are modeled as rational agents seeking to maximize their utility. This utility is assessed 
in terms of homeowners’ gains/losses from the reconstruction. Based on this structure, at 
each time step, the agents compute their expectation from two actions which are: 1) an 
immediate reconstruction, and 2) waiting and making the decision in the next stage. 
These expected values are directly influenced by the actions of neighboring homeowners 
and eventually dominate agents reconstruction decisions.  
To proceed, the section focuses on defining the waiting game among 
homeowners and is extended to derive an equilibrium solution for the game each 
homeowners “plays” with the other in the neighborhood. The section then continues with 
introducing an empirical model which can account for a confluence of factors such as 
homeowners financial status, intensity of damages in the area, and availability of 
infrastructure. The empirical model is based on an experiment designed to establish 
similar conditions to what agents would be facing following a disaster. The reason 
behind developing the empirical model was to incorporate the situational aspect of 
spatial interaction that the theoretical model does not consider. To conclude, the 
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summary of findings is presented which is then followed by the list of limitations of the 
model and the need for future data collection and work.  
 
4.2. THEORETICAL MODEL 
Faced with property damage and partial or even complete destruction of neighborhoods, 
the homeowners often question whether to rebuild the property immediately, or to wait 
and collect more information about the future value of such an action. This new 
information comes from signals from other homeowners in the immediate and extended 
neighborhood as well as policy makers and community leaders. If there is observed 
value in reconstruction (e.g. property values are restored as the community is being fully 
rebuilt), a homeowner will rebuild as well; otherwise, he/she may wait until the next 
time period to observe the value of reconstruction and then make the decision. In fact, 
the choice of “do-now” versus “wait-and-see” has been extensively studied in multiple 
applications where uncertainty is resolved sequentially. 
Given that the value of neighboring reconstruction has a direct impact on the 
future value of the yet-to-be reconstructed properties, it is essential for homeowners to 
update their beliefs of the value of spending a substantial portion of their available 
resources to reconstruct. This externality, the effect of decision making of a set of 
property homeowners on the rest of the homeowners without considering their interests, 
normally leads to a free-rider effect in which some homeowners prefer to wait and 
observe the state of the world while some other homeowners rebuild. By doing this, 
homeowners reduce the risk of reconstructing when the community has not recovered to 
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a functioning level. However, waiting may not always be the optimum strategy as 
homeowners have limited resources for reconstruction that are decreasing as the they 
wait to reconstruct and the benefits arising from the rebuilt properties are foregone. In 
other words, waiting is costly and associated with various costs such as house rentals 
which accumulates over the time and decrease financial flexibility of the homeowners in 
regard to reconstruction. 
The free-rider problem caused by externalities has been extensively studied by 
economists. Groves and Ledyard (1977) presented a solution for optimizing the 
allocation of public goods by formulating a specific allocation-taxation scheme, while 
Porter (1995) studied its effect on the government’s decision making regarding oil and 
gas leases. Also, Hendricks and Porter (1996) presented a Bayesian approach to capture 
its effect on timing of exploratory drilling on wildcat tracts. Much like the theoretical 
model introduced by Hendricks and Porter (1996), homeowners in this research are 
assumed to have an updating-belief structure which is presented below.  
 
4.2.1. Signals and Uncertainty 
Assume that homeowner y  makes the reconstruction decision in a neighborhood of N  
homeowners. Homeowners’ future property values (e.g. homeowner 'sy ( yx ) and that of 
the 1N   neighbors ,  1,..., 1ix X i N   ), are assumed to be random variables from a 
lognormal distribution with geometric mean exp( )  and precision (inverse of the 
variance)  . Therefore by transforming ix  to iz  where ln( ),  1,...,i iz x i N  , it can be 
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concluded that iz  would be a random draw from a normal distribution with mean  and 
precision  . Without loss of generality, precision   is normalized to 1. In this section, 
the logarithms of homeowners’ future property values ( )iz  are considered for the 
purpose of mathematical derivation where 1,..., ~ ( ,1)Nz z N  . It is assumed that 
homeowner 'sy  property value before damage is yv , reimbursements from insurer is yi , 
reconstruction cost is yc  and the reconstruction period is limited to time T . Hence, the 
net present value  ( NPV ) of homeowner y ’s utility at time t  can be expressed as:  
 ( ( ), ) ( ) ln( / )t t y y y yNPV U y t U y z v c i        (4-1)  
 
where t  represents the discount factor for time period t  and ( )U y  denotes homeowner 
'sy utility from reconstruction. Homeowner y ’s belief about the mean of future 
property values of all homeowners ( )  together with its neighbors’ beliefs about its 
actual future property value ( )yz  are updated through future market appraisal 
information known as signals. For all homeowners, signals are considered to be 
normally distributed with mean iz , and precision i  where 1,...,i N .  
Signals represent a belief about the future property values. Therefore, 
homeowner y starts with its initial belief about the value of reconstruction in the 
neighborhood. This initial belief can be updated based on the signals (i.e. revealed 
property values from neighborhood). When the signals are observed, homeowner y
updates its belief about the mean of future property values in the neighborhood. This 
further results in updating the belief of the other homeowners in the neighborhood about 
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yz . This process continues until homeowner y  reconstructs, or decides to sell at its fair 
market value or abandon the property and leave. Here, it is critical to understand how 
signals coming from different agents (e.g. neighbors reconstructing their houses) affect 
homeowners 'y s perception of the value of reconstruction ( )y ys z .  
The belief-updating model used in this subsection is built upon previous studies 
that have investigated sequential decision-making and information updating (e.g. the 
“free-rider” problem, clock game, war of attrition, predator – prey waiting game, etc.). 
More specifically, the model extends the Hendricks and Porter (1996) study on the effect 
of timing on exploratory drilling, and develops a Bayesian value model to account for 
new information and signals. The signals are revealed sequentially as homeowners 
reconstruct ( )i is x . Following Bayes rule and ignoring prior beliefs, it can be shown 
that homeowners’ belief about the mean of future property values in the neighborhood is 
a random draw from a normal distribution with the following parameters: 
1
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The proof for Equations 4-2 and 4-3 are included in Appendix B. Additionally, 
homeowners’ beliefs about , 1,..., (e.g. )i yz i N z  conditional on the observed signals 
from the neighborhood can be shown to be a random draw from a normal distribution 
with the following parameters: 
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The proof for Equations 4-4 and 4-5 is included in Appendix C. Now if some 
(e.g. h  number) of the homeowners reconstruct, homeowners’ beliefs regarding the 
mean of the future property values in the neighborhood ( )  will change respectively. 
The new value will depend on: 1) number of homeowners that reconstructed and have a 
revealed future value 1( ,..., )hz z ; and 2) the remainder of the signals ( )N h which, 
ignoring prior beliefs (using a non-informative prior), is a normal random variable with 
parameters shown in Equations 4-6 and 4-7 (Hendricks and Porter 1996). In these 
equations z  denotes the average revealed future property value and N  represents the 
total number of homeowners in the neighborhood. 
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As shown in Equation 4-6, the new mean is a weighted mean of average revealed 
future property values and the sum of the remaining signals from properties on which 
reconstruction has not been started yet. Conditional on the signals and revealed property 
values, the posterior distribution for beliefs about homeowner 'sy  future property value 
( )yz will be represented by a normal distribution with the parameters shown in 
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Equations 4-8 and 4-9 where 
y
h
z is the mean of homeowners’ beliefs about yz  and y
h
z is 
the precision of homeowners’ beliefs about yz given the new changes in the area. 
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Therefore, homeowner y  starts with its initial belief about the value of 
reconstruction in the neighborhood. This initial belief is updated based on the signals 
and revealed property values from neighboring property homeowners. When the signals 
are observed, homeowner y  updates its belief about the mean of the future property 
values in the neighborhood. This will as well result in updating the belief of the other 
homeowners in the neighborhood about yz . This process continues until homeowner y  
either reconstructs, or sticks to the do-nothing strategy and is shown in Figure 4-1. 
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Figure 4-1. The updating process of the theoretical model 
As shown in Figure 4-1, at time t , there are N homeowners in a given 
neighborhood where each has a signal and precision denoted as is  and i . At this time, 
homeowners’ beliefs about mean of the future property values in the neighborhood ( ) 
and their own future property value ( iz ) is based on these signals and precisions and are 
denoted as ~ ( , )N   and ~ ( , )
i iz z
N   respectively. At time t t , h  number of the 
homeowners reconstruct in the neighborhood. Therefore based on the revealed values of 
those h homeowners, the rest of the homeowners update their beliefs about both mean of 
the future property values in the neighborhood ( ~ ( , )h hN   ) and their own future 
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property value ( ~ ( , )
z zi i
h hN   ). This iterative process continues until everyone 
reconstructs or wait till the last period.  
 
4.2.2. Game and Behavior 
In a multiagent setting, modeling human decision making becomes so complicated that it 
is usually a norm to believe that agents opt for Nash equilibrium strategies (Nash 1950). 
Nash equilibrium is the optimal solution of the game where neither of the players can 
improve their payoffs by unilaterally changing their strategy. Based on this premise, a 
game-theoretic model is developed to account for spatial interactions (e.g. the decision 
to reconstruct depends also on the neighbors and their decisions). In other words, the 
homeowners play a game with two strategies: wait, observe the signals, and reconstruct 
only when there is a sufficient value to do so; or reconstruct immediately, without 
waiting for the others. It is natural that homeowners with high value signals will select 
immediate reconstruction, while the rest will prefer to wait until a positive net value is 
secured.  
However this wait-and-see strategy might not always be the optimal strategy due 
to the financial constraints (e.g. cost of renting). In cases where the net value from 
waiting exceeds that of immediate reconstruction, the game structure resembles war of 
attrition in which a follower may end up with a higher payoff than a leader. To illustrate 
the concept, a situation with only two neighbors (neighbor i  and j ) is considered in 
which ( ),  and ( )t t   represent the mean and precision of future property values at the 
time of consideration (see Subsection 4.2.1). The logic behind a two-neighbor case 
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consideration is two-fold: 1) its simplicity, and 2) the fact that the behavioral analysis for 
the multiple neighbor cases is not significantly different from the equilibrium solution 
for the two-neighbor case (Hendricks and Porter 1996). The expected payoff from 
immediate reconstruction for homeowner i  considering no prior reconstruction can be 
shown as: 
[ | ( ), ( )] ( | ( ), ( )) ( )i iEVI i t t f z t t U i dz                    (4-10)  
 
where [ , | ( ), ( )]EVI i t t t   denotes the expected value from immediate reconstruction for 
homeowner i  at time t  given the current state of information about future property 
values in the neighborhood, ( | ( ), ( ))if z t t   represents the normal probability density 
function of iz  with mean 
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 , and iU  represents 
the gained utility for owner i  at time t . On the other hand, if homeowner i  waits and 
observe its neighbor’s (homeowner j ) action, the state of information about the mean of 
future property values in the neighborhood changes to a new normal distribution with the 
following parameters (Hendricks and Porter 1996): 
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As shown in Equation 4-11, homeowner i ’s belief about ( )t t   is a function 
of homeowner j ’s property value which has not been revealed yet. It can be shown that 
( )t t   has a normal distribution with mean ( )t  and precision 2(1 )t t j    . 
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These derivations are shown in Appendix D. These derivations are used to compute the 
expected payoff of waiting for homeowner i  at time t  which can be denoted as: 
2[ | ( ), ( )] max[0, ( | , ( ))] ( ; ( ), ( ) ( ) (1 ))jEVW i t t EVI i t t f t t t d               (4-13) 
 
where [ | ( ), ( )]EVW i t t   denotes the expected value from waiting for homeowner i  at 
time t  given the current state of information about future property values in the 
neighborhood, ( )t t    and ( | ( ), ( ))EVI i t t t t    denotes the expected value 
from immediate reconstruction for homeowner i  at time t t . In equation 4-13, the 
expected payoff from waiting is assumed to be non-negative. This is attributed to the fact 
that in this model no direct waiting costs are considered for waiting and the act of other 
homeowners may hinder the homeowner reconstruction decision. Therefore as 
mentioned in Equation 4-10, the expectation from immediate reconstruction for owner i  
at time t  is based on its belief about its future property value considering the present 
information about the future property values in the neighborhood. In contrast, owner i  
expectations from waiting depends on its gains from its updated information regarding 
the future property values in the area. This updating process is based on assumption that 
at time t t  owner j  reconstructs. 
 
4.2.3. Game Solution 
Based on these assumptions, the game between the homeowners (homeowners i  and j ) 
can be defined as a war of attrition where homeowners have two pure strategies, 1) 
starting the reconstruction, and 2) waiting for neighbors to reconstruct first and deciding 
37 
 
accordingly. In the case where pure strategies do not result in equilibrium or 
homeowners are not determined about their reconstruction decisions, mixed strategies 
can solve the problem. 
Mixed strategies are formed by assigning probabilities to pure strategies. Mixed 
strategies enable homeowners to randomly select between their pure strategies. For this 
game, the mixed strategy equilibrium can be expressed by the probability of 
reconstruction at each time period conditional on no prior reconstruction. The solution of 
this game can be found using backward induction. In the last period (T ), homeowner i
will start reconstruction if reconstruction has a positive expected value
( ( | ( ), ( ) 0)EVI i T T   . In period 1T  , considering that no prior reconstruction has 
occurred, homeowner i  has two options. If it chooses to reconstruct then its expected 
payoff of immediate reconstruction ( EPI ) would be the same as the last period. This is 
shown in equation 4-14. 
[ , ( 1), ( 1)] max[0, [ , ( 1), ( 1)]EPI i T T EVI i T T         (4-14) 
 
If homeowner i chooses to wait, its expected payoff from waiting ( )EPW
depends on the probability of its neighbor (homeowner j ) reconstructing ( ( | 1)jP R T  ), 
where jR  denotes the action of reconstruction for homeowner j . Consequently 
homeowner i ’s payoff can be shown as: 
( | 1) [ , ( 1), ( 1)]
[ | ( 1), ( 1)]
(1 ( | 1)) max(0, ( | ( 1), ( 1)])
  
j
j
P R T EVW i T T
EPW i T T
P R T EVI i T T
 
  
 
    
    
     
(4-15) 
The first part of the formulation shown in Equation 4-15 indicates the state in 
which homeowner j  reconstructs and homeowner i  updates its belief accordingly, 
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while the next part refers to the state in which homeowner j  does not reconstruct and 
homeowner i  reconstructs if the payoff is positive. Homeowner i would be indifferent 
between immediate reconstruction and waiting if the payoffs are the same. Equating 
equations 4-14 and 4-15 leads to the equilibrium solution for the probability of 
reconstruction at each time period: 
 
(1 ) max[0, [ | ( 1), ( 1)]
( | 1)
[ | ( 1), ( 1)] max[0, [ | ( 1), ( 1)]
  
j
EVI i T T
P R T
EVW i T T EVI i T T
  
    
  
 
      (4-16) 
Considering no prior reconstruction, the same reasoning can be applied to other 
reconstruction periods. Hence, the probability computed in Equation 4-16 is the mixed 
strategy solution for the formulated game. This shows that if the payoff discrepancy 
between waiting and immediate reconstruction is not substantial, an increase in the 
probability of reconstruction will be expected. This can be attributed to signals with high 
precisions. On the other hand, under low precision signals condition, an increase in level 
of discounting will results in an increase in 1(1 ) /    ratio and increase the probability 
of reconstruction now. 
 
4.2.4. MAS Integration 
The result shown in Equation 4-16, indicates the mixed strategy equilibrium for 
homeowners at each period. As previously stated, this equilibrium strategy is denoted in 
the form of probability of reconstruction at each time considering no previous 
reconstruction. To integrate the result in the MAS model, at each period the expected 
value of instant reconstruction together with the expected value of waiting is computed 
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for each homeowner. This will result in probability of reconstruction for each 
homeowner in that period. After computing this probability, a random number within the 
range of zero to hundred is assigned to each homeowner. If the probability of 
reconstruction for a given homeowner exceeds the value of the assigned random number 
divided by hundred exceeds, the homeowner will reconstruct and otherwise the 
homeowner will wait. 
  
4.3. EMPIRICAL MODEL  
This subsection presents an empirical model for making decisions regarding 
reconstruction of properties. The empirical model is based on an experiment designed to 
mimic a situation with conditions similar to real post-disaster conditions. The null 
hypothesis in this part of the study was that homeowners’ decisions are not affected by 
the following variables: 1) availability of infrastructure, 2) percent of damages in the 
area, 3) homeowners’ financial capacity, 4) property value before disaster, and 5) the 
value of a new housing alternative. These parameters were incorporated in the design of 
the experiment. 
 
4.3.1. Experiment Design 
The first step in designing the experiment was to define a scenario. In this experiment, it 
was assumed that a neighborhood with similar house plans and values was affected by a 
hurricane. This has caused a significant damage in the neighborhood, forcing 
homeowners to rent houses in other part of the town. At the same time homeowners need 
40 
 
to make decisions about reconstruction. Under these circumstances, each individual has 
three reconstruction strategies: 1) to reconstruct immediately, 2) to wait six-months and 
observe the reconstruction in the neighborhood, and 3) to take the insurance money and 
buy a new housing alternative somewhere else in the town. Homeowners have no 
information about whether their neighbors will reconstruct but can observe if they will, 
by waiting. If a homeowner reconstructs right away and no one else reconstructs, there 
would be a significant chance that the value of his/her property will be less than the cost 
of reconstruction. In contrast, if they all reconstruct, there would be a high chance of 
getting a property value much higher than the cost of repair. After defining the scenario, 
the next step was to characterize the variables. These variables are assumed to drive 
participants’ decision-makings and capture the different aspects of the initial hypothesis.  
Variables defined for the experiment are as follow: 1) ratio of property values 
before damage to the values of a new housing alternative ( 1r ) that defines the effect of 
new alternative value by contrasting it to the original property value, 2) ratio of available 
funds to required expenses ( 2r ) which denotes homeowners’ financial viability, 3) ratio 
of property value before damage to its damaged value 3r  that represents the influence of 
level of property damage over reconstruction decisions, 4) percent of damages in the 
neighborhood ( )pd , which is an ordinal variable and indicates the severity of damages 
in the area with respective values of 0 for damage percentages below 50% and 1 for 
damages more than 50%, and finally 5) availability of infrastructure in the area ( ai ) with 
three possible values of 0, 1, and 2 where 0 corresponds to the case where there is no 
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infrastructure variable, 1 is the case that the infrastructure will be available in maximum 
3 months, and 3 is the case where the infrastructure is available.  
The ratios defined here were categorized into multiple categories to be also used 
as ordinal variables in the empirical model. The logic behind this step was to eliminate 
the need for a data-intensive model required for continuous variables such as these 
variables. Details regarding categories associated with variables are summarized in 
Table 4-1.  
Table 4-1. Experiment factorial design 
Factor Type Range Subtotal 
 ordinal 1 11,  1r r   2 
 ordinal 
2 2
2 2
2
1,  1 1.5
1.5 2,  2 2.5
2.5
r r
r r
r
  
   

 5 
 ordinal 3 33,  3r r   2 
pd  ordinal 50,  50pd pd   2 
ai  ordinal 0, 1, 2ai ai ai    3 
Total 120 
 
As shown in Table 4-1, based on this experiment design, a total of 120 cases 
were possible. Each case was replicated four times by randomly selecting values from 
each factor level. This led to a total sample size of 480 for the experiment. The designed 
experiment was then used to collect information about participants’ chosen action with 
regard to various post-disaster conditions. As mentioned earlier, the number of 
1r
2r
3r
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participants in the survey was 80 and each participant was given 6 cases. A sample of 
this survey together with its associated instructions is included in Appendix A. 
 
4.3.2. Model Formulation 
The collected data was used to structure a decision making model. To form the model, 
logistic regression was used as the statistical modeling technique. Logistic regression is a 
form of statistical modeling which relates a set of explanatory variables to a categorical 
response variable. Response variables can either have two or more than two categories 
and are called dichotomous or polytomous, respectively. In the case of this survey, the 
response variable could take 3 different categories and as such is a polytomous variable. 
Now depending on the type of the response variable, there are two ways to approach 
logistic regression. If the response variable is ordinal, ordinal logistic regression 
(proportional odds model or cumulative logistic regression) are used (McCullagh 1980) 
whereas when the response variable in nominal, generalized logits (multinomial logistic 
regression) is employed. In this survey the three different values for response variable 
are 1) reconstruct immediately, 2) wait for 6 months, observe neighbors’ action and 
decide accordingly, and 3) take insurance money and buy a housing alternative 
somewhere else. Since the responses are nominal, generalized logits is pursued to 
perform logistic regression. Generalized logit models are extended form of binary logit 
models in which instead of having a single logit model, multiple logits are modeled. 
  
43 
 
4.3.2.1. Binary logit models  
Binary logit models are a member of generalized linear models or GLMs which were 
introduced by Nelder and Wedderburn (1972). Generalized linear models are 
characterized by three components which are: 1) a random factor which represents the 
probability distribution of the response variable; 2) a systematic component which 
denotes a linear function of explanatory variables that are used as regressors; and 3) the 
link which defines the functional relationship between the systematic component and the 
expected value of the random component (Agresti 1990). Binary response Y with 
outcomes 0 and 1 is a Bernoulli random variable with mean 
( ) 1 ( 1) 0 ( 0) ( 1)E Y P Y P Y P Y        . By denoting this probability as ( )x  the 
variance of Y would be: 
2 2( ) ( ) [ ( )] ( )[1 ( )]VAR Y E Y E Y x x      (4-17) 
 
Now for the binary response variable, a linear probability model can be defined 
as: 
( ) ( )E Y x x      (4-18) 
 
The regression model shown in Equation 4-18 displays a major conceptual 
shortcoming associated with linear probability model, which is the occurrence of 
probabilities beyond the feasible range of 0 to 1. To address this defect, it would be more 
beneficial if a logistic regression function is used, which is s-shape and has a monotonic 
relationship with its regressor  (Agresti 1990). This is shown in the following equation: 
exp( )
( )
1 exp( )
x
x
x
 

 


 
 (4-19) 
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As a result, the link function that should be used to make the logistic regression a 
GLM is a log odds transformation or the logit which is shown below (Agresti 1990): 
( )
log
1 ( )
x
x
x

 

 
  
 
 (4-20) 
 
4.3.2.2. Generalized logit model 
Binary logit models can be extended to multinomial logistic model as follow. If response 
variable Y can take on categories 1,2,...,n , choosing k  as the reference category will 
result in: 
( )
log log
( )
j
j
K
P Y j
x
P Y k



   
    
  
 (4-21) 
  
In which k  is the fixed category and j can take on values between 0 and n . In 
addition x is the vector of covariates and j  is the vector of regression coefficients for 
thj  logit. By assuming that the last response category is the same as the reference 
category, the response probabilities ( 1,..., n  ) can be shown as below (SAS 2011): 
1
1
1
1 i
n n
x
i
e







 (4-22) 
jx
j ne

 

  (4-23) 
  
In other words, in generalized logit the log odds of being in one level to being in 
the reference category is computed. In the context of this dissertation, the 
aforementioned description can be interpreted as modeling the log odds of choosing a 
recovery strategy other than instant reconstruction to the recovery strategy of instant 
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reconstruction. The vector of explanatory variables consists of 1 2 3, , , ,  and r r r pd ai  and 
the reconstruction strategy is the response (dependent) variable. 
  
4.3.3. Parameter Estimation 
Assuming N  independent observations of the dependent variable, and multiple 
observations for each fixed 
ix  value, it can be concluded that ( ) ( )i i iE Y n x  where 
{1,..., }i I , and 1 ... In n N   . Given that the joint probability mass function of 1Y  to 
IY  would be proportional to the product of I binomial functions or simply the joint 
conditional probability of the observations, therefore (Agresti 1990):  
1 1
( )
( ) [1 ( )] [1 ( )] exp log
1 ( )
i i i i
I I
y n y n i
i i i i
i i i
x
x x x y
x

  


 
   
      
    
   (4-24) 
  
and as a result the log- likelihood will be defined as: 
( ) log 1 expi ij j i j ij
j i i j
L y x n x  
   
     
     
     (4-25)  
The next step is to differentiate the log-likelihoods with respect to the vector of 
  and equal the results to zero. This will results in the following equations: 
exp
1 exp
j ij
j
i ia i ia
i ia
j ij
j
x
L
y x n x
x



  
  
    
   
   
   

 

 (4-26) 
  
which can be solved using Newton-Raphson method. There are several commercial 
programs which perform these procedures among which SAS was used for the purpose 
of this dissertation. 
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4.3.4. Experiment Results 
The multinomial logistic regression model for this dissertation was approached through 
the use of LOGISTIC procedure in SAS. This procedure is capable of forming 
generalized logits which considering the type of response variable in this experiment, 
qualifies it for implementation. This procedure has also the feature of incorporating 
backward elimination technique in which insignificant covariates are eliminated from 
the model one at a time. For the purpose of backward elimination, the significance level 
was set to 95 percent. The detail results from regression analysis are included in 
Appendix E.  
Interpretation of the results from LOGISTIC procedure starts with model 
information, model type, optimization technique, model convergence status and number 
of observations. In this experiment, a generalized logit model with 480 observations and 
3 nominal categories was studied. The optimization technique was based on Newton-
Raphson method. Model convergence was set to its default criterion ( 810 ). The model 
convergence criterion denotes how well maximum likelihood procedure for parameter 
estimation is converging. In addition, the reference category was selected to be the 
immediate reconstruction strategy versus other reconstruction alternatives. 
In each step of backward elimination procedure, model convergence status is 
checked, then model fit statistics are reported for the model with and without covariates. 
This is then followed by the results of hypothesis checking of model significance with 
regard to its covariates. This iterative process continues until all the parameters 
remaining in the model are statistically significant.  
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According to the results of this study, backward elimination process took 3 steps 
to finalize the model during which two of the parameters were removed from the model. 
These two predictors were 
1r  and 3r . Predictor 1r  captured the effect of new housing 
alternative and independent variable 3r  was the effect of intensity of property damages 
on reconstruction decisions. 
The fit statistics for the model can be divided into two categories. The first is an 
absolute fit statistic which in this study is McFadden’s pseudo R-squared and the second 
is the relative fit statistics known as information criteria an includes AIC (Akaike 
Information Criterion), SIC (Schwarz Information Criterion), and negative two times the 
maximized log-likelihood ( max2log L ). These model fit statistics are defined below.  
McFadden’s R-squared: The structure of McFadden’s pseudo 2r  is similar to the 
original R-squared with this fact that in original R-squared the variability of estimation 
error to that of the data is compared whereas in McFadden’s the log-likelihood of 
models with and without covariates are compared to each other. This likelihood ratio 
indicates the level of improvement gained by the full model over the model without 
covariates (Academic Technology Services 2011). This is shown below. 
2 log ( )1
log ( )
MF
L F
r
L I
   (4-27) 
  
The results from regression analysis revealed a value of 0.203 for McFadden’s R-
squared. Although this value is substantially low compared to original and non-pseudo 
R-squared but still shows a satisfactory level. Although Hosemer and Lemeshow (2000) 
referred to the low McFadden’s R-squared values as being a norm, Shtatland et al. 
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(NSEUG) argued that the interpretation of the statistic is more important than the range 
of its value. Following is the list of information criteria used for the model. 
SIC/BIC (Schwarz/Bayesian Information Criterion): This information criterion is 
comprised of two components as shown in equation 4-28. The first term corresponds to 
maximized log-likelihood maxlog L  whereas the next is the penalty term for overfitting in 
which r  is the number of categories for response variable, s  is the number of covariates 
in the model and if  is the frequency value for 
thi  observation. 
 maxSIC 2log ( 1)( 1) *log i
i
L r s f
 
      
 
  (4-28) 
    
AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) which like BIC is influenced by both 
maximized log-likelihood and overfitting penalty and is shown in Equation 4-29. 
 maxAIC 2log 2 ( 1) ( 1)L r s       (4-29) 
  
During backward elimination these model fit statistics are computed for each 
iteration. The summary of these values are shown in Table 4-2. 
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Table 4-2. SAS results from multinomial logistic regression-Model fit statistics 
  
Criterion Intercept 
Intercept 
& 
Covariates 
(Step0) 
Intercept 
& 
Covariates 
(Step1) 
Intercept 
& 
Covariates 
(Step2) 
AIC 1039.386 841.318 840.080 841.189 
SC 1047.734 891.404 881.818 874.580 
2log L  1035.386 817.318 820.080 825.189 
 
For all these model fit criteria, the lesser the value the better is the fit. This is 
clearly shown in Table 4-2 by contrasting the model with intercept and covariates to the 
model just with the intercept for each step.  
Furthermore, the hypothesis of having statistically significant set of parameters is 
checked by integrating the following tests, 1) Likelihood Ratio Test, 2) Score Test, and 
3) Wald Test. In these tests, the null hypothesis is that the covariates are equal to zero 
and therefore if p-values are not significant, it can be concluded that removing the 
explanatory variables will not affect the fitness of the model. Likelihood Ratio test 
checks the likelihood of data been regressed by an alternative model compare to its base 
model (null hypothesis). In this test the null hypothesis model is the one with just the 
intercept and the alternative model is the one with intercept and covariates. This statistic 
is shown below: 
max0 max1LRT 2[log log ]L L    (4-30) 
 
Likelihood Ratio test is based on the difference between the log-likelihood 
statistics of a model with and without covariates. The distribution of this difference is 
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chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the difference in degrees of freedom of the 
two models. On the other hand, Wald test examines whether a parameter is equal to a 
certain value. Wald test statistic is shown below: 
2
0
ˆ( )
ˆvar( )
WTS
 



 (4-31) 
 
In the context of this dissertation, this certain value is equal to zero and therefore 
failing to reject the null hypothesis denotes that the parameter can be deleted from the 
model. This is because an independent variable with a very small coefficient compare to 
its standard error cannot have a significant effect on estimating the dependent variable. 
Score test perform a similar action to Wald test. The test statistic is shown below which 
takes a chi-square distribution under null hypothesis: 
2
0
0
( )
( )
U
ST
I


  (4-32) 
 
In which log ( | )( ) L xU 




, 
2
2
log ( | )
( )
L x
I




 

, and null hypothesis is 
0 0:H   . According to the results, for all elimination steps, the p-values for these 3 
tests were less than 0.001 for all elimination steps and as a result the null hypothesis of 
having zero covariates was rejected.  
To proceed, the analysis extends to cover the maximum likelihood estimates 
from multinomial logistic regression using LOGISTIC procedure in SAS. These 
estimates are shown in Table 4-3. The details regarding this model can be found in 
Appendix E.  
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Table 4-3. SAS results from multinomial logistic regression-Logistic procedure 
Parameter option  DF Estimate St. Err Wald Chisq Pr>Chisq 
Intercept 2 1 2.0172 0.6538 13.660 0.0002 
Intercept 3 1 1.7657 0.7237 4.3092 0.0379 
2r  2 1 -0.2456 0.1839 7.1375 0.0075 
2r  3 1 -0.1363 0.2119 1.6557 0.1982 
pd  2 1 1.1990 0.2826 18.0035 <0.0001 
pd  3 1 2.7347 0.3342 66.9698 <0.0001 
ai  2 1 -1.1070 0.1910 33.5981 <0.0001 
ai  3 1 -2.1986 0.2248 95.6897 <0.0001 
 
During backward elimination process since parameters 1r  and 3r  did not meet the 
0.05 significance level, were removed from the model. Therefore it can be concluded 
that for these parameters the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. This indicates that the 
effect of a housing alternative and level of property damages on reconstruction decisions 
was not significant. 
As shown in Table 4-3, the parameter estimation results correspond to two sets of 
equations labeled as 2 and 3 in Table 4-3 under column “ option”. These labels refer to 
the categories defined for the response variable. Label 2 refer to the reconstruction 
strategy of waiting for 6 months and observe neighbors’ action and decide accordingly 
whereas label 3 refers to the strategy of getting insurance money and buy a housing 
alternative somewhere else in the town. Regression results denote that both percent of 
damage ( )pd  and availability of infrastructure ( )ai  are statistically significant across the 
two models. Parameter 2r  while significant in the first model, is not significant in the 
52 
 
second model in the presence of other parameters. The resulting equations are listed 
below: 
2
( 2)
log 2.0172 0.2456* 1.1990* 1.1070*
( 1)
P op
r pd ai
P op
 
    
 
 (4-33)  
2
( 3)
log 1.7657 0.1363* 2.7347* 2.1986*
( 1)
P op
r pd ai
P op
 
    
 
 (4-34) 
 
4.3.5. Discussion of the Results 
Equation 4-33 indicates that for every one unit increase in availability of infrastructure 
( )ai , the log of probability of waiting over probability of immediate reconstructing 
(reference option or immediate reconstruction) is decreased by 1.1070. Similarly, a unit 
increase in parameters pd  and 2r  will results in 1.1990 increase and 0.2456 decrease in 
the log-odds of waiting (option 2) to immediate reconstruction (option 1). 
The same logic can be used to interpret the results for Equation 4-34. Other 
important conclusions are, 1) the more the 2r  the less the probability of waiting or 
leaving the area to immediate reconstruction. This means that if available funds exceed 
expenses, it would be less likely for an individual to pursue a reconstruction strategy 
other than the instant reconstruction, 2) the more the pd  the more the likelihood of 
waiting or leaving. This indicates that if the percent of damages in a neighborhood 
increases, it would be more likely for an individual to opt for its second and third 
reconstruction strategies rather than reconstructing right away, and finally 3)  the more 
the ai  the less the odds of waiting or leaving to immediate reconstruction (option1). 
This signifies the fact that if infrastructure is more accessible in a neighborhood, 
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individuals are more likely to stay and reconstruct rather than leave their property for 
other reconstruction strategies. The regression results are included in Appendix E.  
     
4.3.6. MAS Integration 
The results shown in Equations 4-33 and 4-34 indicate the log odds of choosing an 
alternative (waiting or leaving the area) to the reference category (reconstruct 
immediately) based on the three different independent variables. These variables are the 
ratio of available funds to the required expenses, the percent of damages in the area, and 
the availability of infrastructure. To integrate the results in the MAS model, a series of 
steps needs to be taken which are: 1) identifying the infrastructure in the area. In this 
research the only infrastructure that was considered in the multi-agent system model was 
transportation infrastructure; 2) assigning proper level of availability to the existing 
infrastructure based on the defined empirical model. These availability levels are: 
available status, available in three months status and not available status which are set 
based on the distance of the given infrastructure from the source of disaster; 3) assigning 
proper level of damage to each property based on its distance to the source of disaster. 
This will results in calculation of percent of damages in the neighborhood in the MAS 
model; 4) assigning financial resources and proper reconstruction cost to each 
homeowner based on its property level of damage. This will lead to calculation of the 
defined ratio ( 2r ) for each homeowner which denotes their financial flexibility. After 
accomplishing all the previously mentioned steps, the probabilities associated with each 
option for a homeowner can be computed using Equations 4-33, 4-34 and the fact that 
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the sum of the probabilities should add up to 1. After computing the probabilities, just 
like the theoretical approach, a random number within the range of zero to hundred will 
be assigned to each homeowner. For each home owner, If the random number lies within 
the acceptable probability range of a strategy, that strategy will be the one that is 
assumed to be pursued by the homeowner.  
 
4.4. SUMMARY 
The objective of this section was to define a framework which can account for modeling 
agent’s spatial interactions. The section started with a theoretical behavioral model 
which was solely focused on the neighboring aspect of homeowners’ interaction. The 
result from the theoretical approach demonstrated that agents’ actions are influenced by 
other agents in their surroundings. This conclusion was expressed as the probability of 
reconstruction at each time step based on the state of the environment. Furthermore to 
account for other factors, an experiment was designed and implemented with a goal of 
using the data to develop an empirical model.  
The results from the empirical model show that in a more realistic post-disaster 
situation, the decision making of affected homeowners is significantly influenced by 3 
variables: 1) severity of damages in the area which has a direct influence on choosing an 
alternative to reconstruct immediately, 2) availability of infrastructure in the area which 
in contrast to the previous parameter has a diverse effect on choosing an alternative to 
immediate reconstruction, and finally 3) the financial viability of homeowners which 
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favors instant reconstruction. The next section proceeds to capture the next micro-level 
research question, which is how agents interact in the organizational domain. 
 
4.5. LIMITATIONS 
Although the results from both theoretical and empirical models yielded rational results, 
there were limitations associated with each modeling approach that might affect the 
broad applicability of the results. These limitations are listed separately for each model.  
In the theoretical model, the defined utility for homeowners had a limited number 
of parameters in contrast to its complex structure in real conditions. Furthermore, other 
influencing parameters such as availability of infrastructure were not included in the 
model. In addition, the mixed strategy equilibrium for the probability of reconstruction 
at each time step was based on the assumption that the interaction between homeowners 
starts with a case where there are just two homeowners and this is not significantly 
different from the results of a sub-game perfect equilibrium. On the other hand, in the 
empirical model, the number of influencing variables were limited. in addition, due to 
the insufficient number of participants for the experiment, all the variables were defined 
as ordinal.  
To overcome these limitations, the theoretical model should be extended  to 
account for multi-neighbor cases. On the other hand due to the fact that in the empirical 
model, parameter estimation is based on maximum likelihood method, the more the data 
the better is the model. Therefore to have a better predictor of real conditions, more data 
is needed which requires a huge number of survey participants. 
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5. MODELING ORGANIZATIONAL INTERACTIONS 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this section is to address the second micro-level objective of this 
dissertation - how individuals interact in the organizational domain while negotiating 
with high-bargaining-power entities such as insurers. Much like the previous chapter, 
this section is divided into two subsections. The objective of the first subsection is to 
present a theoretical model of homeowner-insurer bargaining process, while the next 
subsection is focused on comparing the results from theoretical model with the data from 
an experimental study. The summary of findings is presented in the third subsection, 
which is then followed by the assumptions and limitations in this section. 
 
5.2. THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
5.2.1. Background 
Bargaining situations from a broad perspective occur when individuals or organizations 
have a common interest in cooperation and conflicting interests in the form of 
cooperation (Muthoo 2002). An example of these situations is the common-conflicting 
set of interests with regard to division of a surplus between players. 
Bargaining theory has been widely discussed in literature and applied to many 
research domains. The motivation behind implementation of bargaining theory is to 
capture the behavior of players in a game with mutual interests. Examples of bargaining 
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situations in different research areas include bribery and corruption (Basu et al. 1992; 
Hindriks et al. 1999), wage negotiations (Gertler and Trigari 2009; Knabe 2009; Ellis 
and Fender 1985; Grout 1984; McDonald and Solow 1981), marriage (Lundberg and 
Pollak 1993; McElroy and Horney 1981; Manser and Brown 1980), coalition formation 
(Psathas and Stryker 1965), conflict analysis (Anbarci et al. 2002), bid bargaining games 
(Daniel et al. 1998), and war modeling (Reed 2003).  
In the context of homeowner-insurer negotiations, the related studies include the 
availability of equilibrium in competitive insurance markets by Rothschild and Stiglitz 
(1976), the existence of equilibrium in reinsurance markets by Borch (1962), the effect 
of risk aversion on bargaining by Kihlstrom and Roth (1982), the analysis of 
monopolistic insurance markets by Stiglitz (1977), and the two-person insurance 
negotiation by Schlesinger (1984). 
The focus of this subsection is on the application of bargaining theory in post-
disaster negotiations; more specifically, to investigate the interactions between affected 
homeowners on one side, and insurers on the other. This is a very important, yet often 
overlooked aspect of the recovery process. There are numerous reported cases where 
insurance settlement offers were much lower than estimated losses and claims. 
Following Hurricane Katrina, National Public Radio (NPR) and Public Broadcasting 
Service (PBS) have extensively reported on the problems homeowners have in settling 
claims and obtaining insurance. A similar problem was reported by the Port of New 
Orleans. Here, the bargaining power of the insurers is much greater than the bargaining 
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power of the homeowners. In such settings, “stressed” agents are often impatient and 
willing to accept offers they might not otherwise have considered.  
Therefore there is a need to model this process so that public agencies can react 
correspondingly. In this section the goal is to address the same need using both 
theoretical and empirical models. While theoretical model conceptually approaches the 
problem, the empirical model reflects the results from the experiment. 
 
5.2.2. Model Formulation  
The bargaining model presented here is designed to capture the interaction between 
players in the incidence of a disaster. In this settings, the two players are 1) insurer and 
2) homeowner. In addition, it is assumed that the players are bargaining over the 
difference between the maximum claim amount and no compensation.  
Homeowners seek to maximize their claims while insurers try to minimize their 
losses. Under this bargaining situation, one of the major driving factors is the available 
strategies for both players. Each strategy will result in a payoff, which in bargaining 
literature is divided into two categories. The first category is attributed to the payoffs 
that are acquired while players are still in-play, negotiating to achieve an agreement and 
is called an inside option. The other category is related to payoffs gained by players due 
to quitting the game without reaching to an agreement (Muthoo 1999). In the theoretical 
owner-insurer negotiation framework of this dissertation, while no specific inside option 
was considered for players, the only available outside option was the payoff from 
referring the case to court.   
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The model was designed in such a way that it can mimic a bargaining situation in 
a case of a disaster. Following a disaster, bargaining starts between the affected 
population and their insurers regarding the amount of compensation for the incurred 
damage. Subsequent to the incidence, an insurer and homeowner start negotiating to 
reach an agreement. The players are assumed to be rational players and therefore 
maximizing their utilities. 
The sequence of this bargaining game is as follows: The insurer starts the 
negotiation by offering a claim amount to the homeowner. To respond, the homeowner 
has three strategies: 1) accept the insurer’s offer, 2) reject and continue negotiation by 
making a counteroffer, and 3) reject and take the case to the court in the next period. If 
the homeowner chooses the first strategy the game is finished, if it prefers to take the 
case to court both players will get their undiscounted court payoffs; and finally if the 
homeowner opts for a counteroffer, the insurer has the option to either accept or reject 
this counteroffer. In the next period, if the insurer accepts the offer, the game ends and if 
he rejects, the case will be taken to court in which both players will get their court 
payoffs. The homeowner’s court payoff is assumed to be a random draw from a uniform 
distribution, (in this study distribution parameters are assumed to be 0.7a   and 0.9b 
) of the maximum claim amount which will be discounted by a common discount factor 
(assumed to be 0.9  ) for each time step that an agreement is not achieved. For 
simplicity the maximum claim amount is assumed to be 1. The discount factor is 
incorporated in the model to account for the costly nature of waiting. Furthermore, both 
players have a unique outside option, which is pursued by taking the case to court. It is 
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also assumed that the bargaining problem is a multi-period process, which will be 
resolved in two-steps. In this model delay can be costly and in equilibrium condition, the 
very first offer is accepted. 
 
5.2.3. Model Solution 
Since the bargaining problem in this research is a finite sequential process, the extensive 
form of the game can be used to find the equilibrium strategy for the players. The 
extensive form of the game is shown in Figure 5-1. In the extensive from, the game is 
broken down into its feasible sets of strategies called subgames. The next step is to 
check for Nash equlibria in each subgame. A Nash equilibrium is an optimal solution for 
a game in terms of strategies for players, in which none of the players can improve their 
payoffs by unilaterally changing their strategy. This process leads to finding the 
subgame perfect Nash equilibria for the game. In the context of this dissertation, the goal 
is to find an equilibrium offer in the insurer-homeowner negotiations. This equilibrium 
strategy implies the amount of offer that should be made by insurer in the first period to 
make the homeowner indifferent between accepting and rejecting and eventually 
accepting the offer. The idea of subgame-perfect equilibrium for extensive-form games 
was initiated by Selten (1978). A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is a strategy which 
leads to the Nash Equilibrium of every subgame of the original game. To compute 
subgame perfect Nash equilibria, backward induction method is used. Backward 
induction is an iterative process in which the optimal strategy is initially found for the 
last period of the game and is subsequently used to find the optimal strategies for the 
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previous stages. This backward process continues until all players’ actions are being 
determined. In this study the game in its extensive form (Figure 5-1), is a finite 
sequential game in which the game starts with a first offer, continues with a possible 
counteroffer and ends with acceptance or the court payoffs.  
 
Figure 5-1. Extensive form of the bargaining game 
Consider the backward induction process for the extended form of the game in 
Figure 5-1, it is shown that in the 3rd period, if they do not reach the agreement 
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beforehand, both players will get their court payoffs ,I oC C . IC  is insurer’s court payoff 
whereas oC  is homeowner’s court payoff. In this period the negotiation value has been 
discounted twice, therefore 2I oC C   . Now by moving one step backward in period 
2, there are two strategies available for the homeowner. The first is to reject insurer’s 
offer (from the first period) and go to the court whereas the second is to reject the offer 
and make a counteroffer. If homeowner chooses the first option the payoffs for insurer 
and homeowner would be , oI
CC
 
respectively.  
On the other hand if homeowner chooses to make a counteroffer the payoffs will 
change to ,I IC C  . This is due to the fact that the homeowner knows that if insurer 
does not accept the offer, the case will be directed to court and insurer will get its court 
payoff. Therefore homeowner will make its offer to be the same as insurer’s court 
payoff. In addition, since in this period the negotiation value has been discounted once. 
Proceeding with the backward process in period 1, there is a unique strategy for the 
insurer to start the bargaining process.  
Since insurer knows that in period 2, homeowner will opt for the second strategy 
which is rejecting and making a counter offer (since the outcome of this strategy for the 
homeowner is always higher than the outcome from directing the case to court), insurer 
will make its offer to be the same as homeowner’s highest payoff in the 2nd period. As a 
result insurer’s equilibrium strategy would be to offer IC   for homeowner and keep 
1 IC   for himself. This strategy profile concludes the theoretical approach to solve 
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the bargaining game. The next subsection will approach the problem from an empirical 
point of view to contrast the results to that of a theoretical approach. 
 
5.2.4. MAS Integration 
The result from the theoretical approach to capture the organizational behavior of 
homeowners was presented as an equilibrium offer from insurer in the first period. The 
structure of this equilibrium offer is very similar to the alternating offer bargaining 
model by Rubinstein (1982). This equilibrium offer is based on three variables which 
are: 1) discount factor, 2) maximum bargaining value, and 3) Insurer’s court payoff 
wghich are initially defined for the model. Therefore integration of these results in the 
MAS model requires entering the proper values for each variable and for each 
homeowner in the model. 
 
5.3. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 
5.3.1. Experiment Design 
The empirical model studied in this dissertation is based on an experiment designed to 
capture a similar situation to what occurs between insurer and homeowner following a 
disaster. The experiment was designed to pose a situation that maybe more familiar to 
the participants (i.e. undergraduate students). Among the possible options, a case of a car 
accident seemed to be a good example due to its nature and the way the negotiations 
between players take place. This is due to the fact that the strategies defined for both 
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parties are the same as those identified for the theoretical model. Therefore, the game 
starts with insurer’s offer to car-owner. The car-owner can accept the offer, reject- go to 
court, and reject-make a counter offer. The next step starts with insurer’s either 
accepting or rejecting car-owner’s offer. Failing to reach an agreement in the second 
period, will result in court payoffs for both parties. The details regarding the experiment 
together with the instructions to participants are included in Appendix F. Results from 
this experiment were used to formulate an empirical model to estimate more realistic 
choices and compared to the theoretical model to check for similarities and 
dissimilarities. 
 
5.3.2. Model Formulation  
Unlike the previous section, in the empirical model formulation there is no equilibrium 
offer available for the insurer to start the negotiation. In other words, an empirical model 
considers a payoff structure for players which is formed by incorporating their strategies 
and the associated probabilities with each of the strategies. The objective of this 
subsection is to estimate these strategies and probabilities by incorporating the data from 
the experiment and test for several hypotheses related to the empirical model presented 
below: 
'
1 11 1 12 2 13( )+ ( )  ( )
Ob P b b
C
P P

   (5-1)                    
'
2 21 21 2 )( ) (1- )(  Ob P C P b   (5-2) 
                           
In equations above , {1,2}ib i  is car-owner’s payoff in the 
thi  period, 
, {1,2}, {1,2,3}ijP i j   is the probability of incurring event j  at period i , OC  is car-
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owner’s court payoff,   is the common discount factor for both of the players, '
1b  is 
insurer’s offer to the car-owner in the first period, and finally '
2b  is the car-owner’s offer 
in the second period. As shown in Equations 5-1 and 5-2, in the first period car-owner’s 
expected payoff would be a combination of its payoffs from various game outcomes 
with their associated probabilities.  
There are three strategies available for the car-owner in this period, the first is to 
pursue its court payoff which is the third term in Equation 5-1 ( /OC  ), the next is to 
reject insurer’s offer and make a counteroffer which corresponds to the second term of 
the equation ( 2b ), and finally the last is to accept the insurer’s offer which corresponds 
to the first term in the equation ( 1b ). Similarly in the second period the car-owner’s 
expected payoff is a combination of its payoff from 1) court payoff due to insurer’s 
rejection ( OC ), and 2) its own offer due to insurer’s acceptation of the offer ( 2b ) and 
their associated probabilities. 
 
5.3.3. Model Fitting 
The subsequent step to model formulation is to estimate the parameters in Equations 5-1 
and 5-2 by formulating and testing the hypotheses. The null hypotheses formed for this 
purpose are as following: 1) insurer’s initial offer to homeowner ( 1b ) does not follow a 
specific distribution, 2) car-owners’ decision following insurer’s initial offer is not 
associated with the size of insurer’s initial offer. This hypothesis is to check whether 
probabilities associated with homeowner’s response ( 11 12 13, ,  and P P P ) to insurer’s initial  
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offer ( 1b ) is significantly related to the size of the offer from insurer ( 1b ) , 3) car-
owner’s counter offer (
2b ) is not associated with insurer’s initial offer ( 1b ), 4) insurer’s 
decision to car-owner’s counteroffer is not related to the magnitude of the counteroffer (
2b ). The assumptions were statistically analyzed to check for validity and significance. 
The whole process is shown in Figure 5-2.   
1) insurer’s initial offer does not follow a specific 
distribution
Data
Model Fitting Goodness of Fit Tests
HYPOTHESES
2) car-owner’s decision regarding insurer’s initial offer 
is not associated with the size of insurer’s initial offer
3) car-owner’s counteroffer is not associated with the 
size of insurer’s initial offer
4) insurer's decision regarding owner’s counteroffer is 
not associated with the size of owner’s counteroffer
 
Figure 5-2. The process of experimental model development 
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5.3.3.1. Null Hypothesis 1: “Insurer’s initial offer does not follow a specific 
distribution” 
The null hypothesis is that the observed data from insurer’s offer are not random draws 
from a specific distribution. A variety of methods can be used to fit distributions to data 
and check for their statistical significance. These fitting procedures can either be 
empirical (nonparametric) or parametric. Each of these methods has its own benefits and 
drawbacks. Nonparametric models are usually easier to use but at the same time need 
larger sample sizes. Parametric models are more complicated but are capable of 
estimating parameters inside the feasible range and outside the observed data (Vose, 
2008).  
For the purpose of this dissertation since regression outcome is intended to be 
directly used in the MAS model, the preference was given to a parametric regression. To 
accomplish this, a wide range of possible distributions were checked for the observed 
data through ModelRisk by Vose Software in which a total of 51 continuous univariate 
distributions where fitted to data.  
In this approach Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) technique was used for 
parameter estimation. The fitting results were rank ordered based on their information 
criteria. Three information criteria were used to rank the fitted distributions. These 
information criteria were: 1) SIC (Schwarz Information Criterion); 2) AIC (Akaike 
Information Criterion); and 3) HQIC (Hanna-Quinn Information Criterion). Information 
criteria were used as replacements for popular goodness of fit statistics such as Chi-
Square, Kolmogorov-Smirnoff, and Anderson-Darling. The reason is a set of drawbacks 
68 
 
associated with them such as, 1) they present the probability that data generated from the 
fitted distribution has a goodness of fit statistic as low as the observed data instead of 
providing a probability that observed data are necessarily random draws from the fitted 
distribution, and 2) they cannot integrate censored, truncated, or binned data (Vose 
2008).  
For information criteria, the lower the values are the better the fit will be. The 
other main benefit of using information criteria is that they penalize the model for 
overfitting which is caused by additional parameters in the model to increase the 
likelihood. The first two information criteria were described earlier in the chapter. 
Similar to AIC and SIC, HQIC is also comprised of a separate component for the 
maximized likelihood and a penalizing component for the number of parameters. This is 
shown in Equation 5-3.  
maxHQIC 2log 2ln[ln[ ]]L n k    (5-3) 
 
in which n  is the number of observations, and k  is the number of predictors. Among 
these criteria SIC is the one with more penalizing power and AIC is the one with the 
least (Vose 2008). The summary of fitting results rank ordered by their fitting statistics is 
shown in Table 5-1. As shown in the table the best fit resulted from a Laplace 
distribution with location parameter (  ) of 7000 and scale parameter ( b ) of 1044.7.  
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Table 5-1. List of the top 3 fitted distributions 
Distribution AIC SIC HQIC 
Laplace -1186.853 -1182.504 -1184.127 
Log-Laplace -1194.104 -1187.674 -1190.015 
GLogistic -1195.233 -1188.803 -1191.144 
 
 
Apart from model fit statistics, goodness of fit plots are also a good measure to 
visually check the overall fit of a proposed model. Figure 5-3 shows these plots taken 
from the output of ModelRisk software.  The plots are 1) histogram of the observed data 
versus PDF of the fitted distribution, 2) cumulative histogram of the observed data 
versus CDF of the fitted model, 3) Q_Q plot or Quantile-Quantile plot which is a 
probability plot that contrast two probability distributions (observed against fitted) by 
plotting their quantiles against each other, and 4) P_P plot or Probability-Probability plot 
which is a graphical representation of comparing two cumulative distributions (observed 
against fitted) against each other. In the first two plots, the goodness of fit can be 
visually checked by observing how the histograms of the observed data match the PDF 
and CDF of the fitted distribution. In Q-Q and P_P plots, the goodness of fit can be 
observed by checking how close the quantiles and cumulative distributions from 
observed data match up with the same values for the fitted distribution. In an ideal case 
the values should lie on the diagonal line shown in Figure 5-3.  
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a) PDF observed vs. fitted 
 
b) CDF observed vs. fitted 
 
c) P-P plot 
 
d) Q_Q plot 
 
Figure 5-3. Goodness of fit plots (ModelRisk Vose Software) 
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Since information criteria such as AIC do not provide test statistics, a similar 
approach was performed in another commercial statistical software, EasyFit, in which 
the Laplace distribution was contrasted to four major univariate distributions which were 
Lognormal, Gamma, Normal and Weibull. The results from EasyFit statistical analysis 
are shown in Figure 5-4 and Table 5-2. The results demonstrated that the Laplace 
distribution fairly predicted the data, had the highest overall ranking, and as such 
rejected the first null hypothesis that the data are not random draws from a specific 
distribution.  
 
Figure 5-4. Fitted distributions to the data (EasyFit Software) 
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Table 5-2. EasyFit statistical analysis result for fitted distributions (numbers in parentheses 
denote distribution ranking for each test) 
 
Kolmogorov 
Smirnoff 
Anderson Darling Chi-Squared 
Distributions Statistic Pvalue Statistic Pvalue Statistic Pvalue 
Laplace       (1,2,4) 0.19718 0.00679 2.495 NS 29.269 2.05E-5 
Gamma       (4,4,1) 0.25145 1.92E-4 3.8225 S 11.988 0.03496 
Lognormal  (5,5,5) 0.25827 1.15E-4 4.3173 S 39.649 1.76E-7 
Normal        (3,3,3) 0.233 7.139E-4 2.9838 S 24.869 1.477E-4 
Weibull       (2,1,2) 0.19823 0.00639 2.193 NS 23.767 2.41E-4 
 
The results from hypothesis testing in this subsection showed that insurer’s initial 
offer  ( 1b ) can be fitted to a Laplace distribution with parameters 7000   and 
1044.7b   via significant goodness of fit statistics. This is clearly shown in Table 5-2. 
In this table for each fitted distribution, three goodness of fit statistics are presented 
together with their respective Pvalues. Furthermore the ranking of each distribution for 
those statistics are given. Based on these information, the Laplace distribution had the 
best overall ranking of 1st for Kolmogorov Smirnoff, 2nd for Anderson Darling, and 4th 
for Chi-squared. This denotes that the first hypothesis indicating that insurer’s initial 
offer is not a random draw from a specific distribution can be rejected.  
 
5.3.3.2. Null Hypothesis 2: “There is no association between insurer’s offer and car-
owner’s following actions” 
The next step to integrate the bargaining game in the MAS model is to inspect the effect 
of changes in the value of the insurer’s offer on car-owner’s decision making in the first 
bargaining period. This requires a statistical modeling technique in which the outcome 
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variable is categorical. In this phase of bargaining there are 3 available options for the 
car-owner which are 1) accept the offer, 2) reject and make a counter offer, and 3) reject 
and go to court. Since the response variable is nominal and has more than 2 categories, 
multinomial logistic regression would be the proper modeling technique. The modeling 
procedure is the same as the one described for spatial experiment. Results from SAS 
statistical modeling software for multinomial regression is summarized in Table 5-3. The 
details are included in Appendix G. Since no ordinal classification can be assigned to the 
different levels of dependent variable, generalized logits is again employed for the 
analysis. The reference category for analysis was set to car-owner’s last option which is 
to accept the offer. The second option was set to be the owner’s counteroffer and finally 
the third option is to refer the case to court. 
Table 5-3. SAS results from multinomial logistic regression-Logistic procedure 
Parameter act DF Estimate St. Err Wald Chisq Pr>Chisq 
Intercept 2 1 4.3344 0.6538 4.6156 0.0317 
Intercept 3 1 3.5939 0.7237 2.1046 0.1469 
Offer 2 1 -0.00068 0.00029 5.4247 0.0199 
Offer 3 1 -0.00072 0.000365 3.8889 0.0486 
 
The results from regression analysis indicates that the value of the offer in the 
first period is statistically significant across the two models. The outcomes of this 
logistic regression analysis can be shown in the following two equations: 
12
1
11
log 4.3344 0.00068*
P
b
P
 
  
 
 (5-4)  
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13
1
11
log 3.5939 0.00072*
P
b
P
 
  
 
 (5-5) 
 
Equation 5-4 indicates that for every one unit increase in insurer’s initial offer ( 1b ), the 
log of probability of choosing the counteroffer strategy over probability of accepting the 
offer (reference option) is decreased by 0.00068. Similarly in Equation 5-5, a unit 
increase in insurer’s initial offer ( 1b ) will result in 0.00072 decrease in the log-odds of 
choosing the court option instead of accepting the offer. Furthermore these equations 
indicate that the more the offer is, the less would be the likelihood of preferring any 
other options over accepting the offer. The results from multinomial logistic regression 
in this part, contribute to finding the probability associated with owner’s different 
strategies ( 11 12 13, ,  and PP P ) in Equation 5-1, in response to insurer’s initial offer ( 1b ).   
 
5.3.3.3. Null Hypothesis 3: “Car-owner’s counter offer is not associated with insurer’s 
offer in the first bargaining phase” 
The third step was to check the hypothesis of not having an association between 
insurer’s actions and car-owner’s counter-offer. The hypothesis is checked by fitting a 
linear model to the data and check for the significance of the results.  
There are four major criteria to be checked for a linear relationship between two 
variables, these criteria are: 1) linearity, which is to check whether the predictor and the 
response variable have a linear relationship. This can be checked by plotting the 
residuals against fitted values and check whether the distribution of the points is 
symmetrical along the horizontal line, 2) independence, which is to inspect whether 
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there is a correlation among residuals which can indicate that there is a potential for 
model improvement. Independence can be checked by computing the autocorrelation 
among the residuals, 3) homoscedasticity, which is to check for the homogeneity of the 
variances and can be checked by inspecting the residual versus predicted values plot and 
look for any heterogeneity, and 4) normality, which is to check whether the errors are 
normally distributed in the model. Failing to demonstrate normally distributed errors in 
the model can be a good indication of having an outlier. This significantly affects 
parameter estimation, which in turn relies on minimizing the squared errors. This 
phenomenon can be detected by drawing the normal probability plot of the residual and 
check whether the points are randomly distributed along the diagonal line (Decision 
Forecasting 2011).  
The analysis of data for linear regression was performed in both R and SAS 
programming environment. Table 5-4 summarizes the result from the original data in R. 
The results from linear regression denotes a significant linear relationship between car-
owner’s counter offer and insurance initial offer and as a result the null hypothesis of not 
having an association between these two parameters is rejected.  
Table 5-4. R results from linear regression modeling for car-owner’s counter offer 
Parameter Estimate St. Err t value Pr>|t| 
Intercept 2671.4749 814.7944 3.279 0.00343 
Insurance-Offer 0.8449 0.1242 6.803 7.78e-07 
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In addition to Table 5-4, Figure 5-5 presents model’s goodness-of-fit plots. As 
shown in the figure, there is a clear indication of having an outlier in the model. This can 
be detected by observing: 1) the residuals are not normally distributed along the 
horizontal line shown in the upper left side of the graph labeled as “Residuals vs Fitted”, 
and 2) there is a point on “Residual vs Leverage” graph with a Cook’s distance higher 
than 1, and 3) in the “Scale-Location” graph, there is a distinct trend in the distribution 
of the points.  
 
Figure 5-5. Model fit plots (R) 
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To address the problem the fifth observation was treated as an outlier and was 
deleted from the data (as labeled in the graphs) and the new data was analyzed. The 
goodness-of-fit plots are shown in Figure 5-6, while regression results are shown  in 
Table 5-5. 
 
 
Figure 5-6. Model fit plots-Without outlier 
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Table 5-5. R results from linear regression modeling for car-owner’s counter offer-without 
outlier 
Parameter Estimate St. Err t value Pr>|t| 
Intercept 3854.0463 865.5643 4.453 0.00022 
Insurance-Offer 0.6743 0.1299 5.190 3.83e-05 
 
As shown in Figure 5-6, the violations for linear regression criteria in the first 
model was fairly addressed by eliminating the fifth observation. Results from SAS linear 
regression analysis revealed a better linear fit compare to the original data. The details 
regarding this analysis are shown in Appendix H.  
The statistical analysis results demonstrated a significant linear relationship 
between insurer’s initial offer and owner’s counteroffer. Therefore it can be concluded 
that the third null hypothesis of not having any association between these two values is 
rejected. This enables the model to predict owner’s counteroffer ( 2b ) in Equation 5-2 
based on the insurer’s initial offer ( 1b ) in Equation 5-1. 
 
5.3.3.4. Null Hypothesis 4: “Insurer’s action following car-owner’s counteroffer is not 
associated with the value of car-owner’s counter-offer” 
Finally, the last part of incorporating the bargaining concept into the MAS model was to 
check for any association between the value of car-owner’s counteroffer and the 
probability of acceptance by insurer. Since under these settings, the response variable is 
categorical and has just two categories (accept or reject), binomial logistic regression 
was selected for modeling. Parameter estimation and optimization technique for binary 
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logit models were previously described in the Section 4. Table 5-6 shows the regression 
results. The details regarding the regression results are included in Appendix I. 
Table 5-6. Results from binomial logistic regression - R 
Parameter Estimate St. Err Z Value Pr(>|Z|) 
Intercept -1.565e+1 7.427 -2.107 0.0352 
offer 1.99e-03 9.089e-04 2.190 0.0285 
 
The outcome from logistic regression indicates a statistical significance for the 
influence of car-owner’s counteroffer on insurer’s acceptance and hence the null 
hypothesis of having no association between these parameters is rejected. The resulting 
equation can be written as below: 
21
2
21
log 15.65 1.99 03*( )
1
P
e b
P
 
    
 
 (5-6) 
 
Equation 5-6 indicates that for every one unit increase in car-owner’s 
counteroffer, the log of probability of rejection versus acceptance increases by 1.99*e-
03. Furthermore this shows that the more the counteroffer is the less would be the 
likelihood of accepting the offer by the insurer. The results obtained here help predict the 
probabilities regarding insurer’s accepting or rejecting owner’s counteroffer ( 21P ) in 
Equation 5-2 and conclude the simulation of empirical bargaining procedure in the MAS 
model.  
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5.3.4. Estimation Results 
As previously mentioned, data from the experimental study was used for estimating 
parameters of the empirical model (see Equations 5-1 and 5-2). These parameters 
include insurer’s first offer (
1b ), car-owner’s counter offer ( 2b ) and probabilities 
associated with each of the actions ( 11 12 13 21, , ,  and P P P P ). For the insurer’s first offer, the 
statistical analysis showed that the hypothesis of having a model to significantly fit the 
data is valid and the model is a Laplace distribution. Furthermore, the results from 
multinomial regression analysis showed that the owner’s probability of accepting the 
insurer offer, rejecting it, or making a counter offer is significantly associated with the 
amount of insurer’s offer. In addition, the analysis indicated that the owner’s 
counteroffer is a significant linear relation with the amount of insurer’s offer. Finally the 
statistical analysis showed that the insurer’s reaction to owner’s counteroffer is 
significantly associated with the amount of owner’s counteroffer. The generalized 
bargaining model helps automate the empirical bargaining process in the MAS model 
and reveals how agents would behave under various post disaster bargaining situations. 
  
5.3.5. MAS Integration 
To integrate the results in the MAS model the following steps should be taken: 1) to 
code a program which can generate random variables from a Laplace distribution with 
its given parameters, 2) calculate the probabilities associated with homeowners’ action 
based on the value generated from the Laplace distribution using Equations 5-5 and 5-5, 
3) calculate homeowner’s counter offer based on insurer’s initial offer using the results 
81 
 
shown in table 5-5, and finally 4) compute the probabilities associated with insurer’s 
action in response to homeowner’s counter offer using Equation 5-6. Accomplishing 
these steps leads to calculate the expected value of homeowners payoff in the first period 
( 1b ) and concludes this subsection. 
 
5.3.6. Summary 
The objective of this section was to define a framework which can represent agents’ 
organizational behavior while negotiating with higher bargaining power entities such as 
insurers. The section started with a theoretical model to present the optimal bargaining 
solution under post disaster conditions. The second part of the section was focused on 
capturing the same aspect of organizational interaction but from a more realistic point of 
view. To accomplish this task, an experiment was designed to support building an 
empirical model. Data collected from the experiment was used for parameter estimation 
for the empirical model using various statistical analysis methods. The next section 
introduces the multi agent framework and elaborates on how the models presented in 
Sections 4 and 5 will be incorporated in such a framework. 
 
5.4. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Similar to the previous chapter, there are a few assumptions and limitations associated 
with this section which are: 1) simplifying the theoretical bargaining process in a 3-
period bargaining model; 2) using a common discount factor for both of the insurer and 
homeowner in the theoretical model; 3) assuming no inside option and a unique outside 
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option for both of the players; 4) assuming certain court payoffs for both players; 5) 
assuming a different hypothetical scenario for the empirical model, and 6) not having a 
large number of participants for the empirical model.  
Future work is needed to address the aforesaid limitations. The theoretical model 
needs to integrate additional parameters including inside options or additional outside 
options. This can include the outside option of selling properties to other entities with a 
higher bargaining power rather than facing the insurer directly.  Regarding the empirical 
model, a large number of participants is required to address the need for the intensive 
data requirement of model fitting due to the maximum likelihood method.    
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6. MULTIAGENT SYSTEM SIMULATION MODEL 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this section is to present a framework, which is capable of integrating 
the proposed spatial and organizational models, and analyze the results. Due to the 
complex nature of post-disaster recovery, this framework was based on previously 
discussed Multi-dimension Multi Agent Systems (MD-MAS) model. This MAS model 
selection allowed for simulating every single agent (homeowner) and their actions under 
the governing conditions and assessing the outcomes of their mutual interactions. The 
section starts with an introduction to MAS and extends to capture the structure of the 
model and its specifications. To proceed, the section presents a case study that considers 
both theoretical and empirical models to assess the recovery dynamics in the two-
pronged spatial-organizational domain. The result from the model is then checked for 
sensitivity to different simulation set-up parameters. Finally the section ends with the 
summary of key discoveries and directions for future research. 
 
6.2. MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS 
The Multi Agent Systems (MAS) approach is applied in many research domains that 
require capturing dynamic interactions among multiple stakeholders. Examples of MAS 
application covers a wide range of domains including land-use and land-cover change 
(Parker et. al. 2003), epidemiology (Yergens et al. 2006), and traffic and transportation 
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in complex networks (Burmeister et al. 1997). The MAS results often reveal the hidden 
behavior by accounting for temporal spatial interactions. 
The MAS model is based on simulation of intelligent agents designed to achieve 
a variety of goals. The agents may have common or conflicting goals and may interact 
with other agents directly or indirectly (Bellifemine, 2007). Wooldridge and Jennings 
(1995) classifies intelligent agents as being reactive, proactive, and social. Furthermore, 
Padgham and Winikoff (2004) define an intelligent agent as an autonomous system 
situated in an environment, which is reactive to the changes in the environment, pursues 
its objectives determinedly while being flexible, recuperates from failures, and finally 
interacts with other agents.  
The MAS model features have led to their implementation in different research 
areas such as modeling population dynamics based on economic status and cultural 
identity (Benenson, 1998), spatial patterns of unemployment (Conley and Topa, 2002), 
firms’ spatial competition (Collins and Sherstyuk, 2000), complexity in human-
environment interaction (An et al., 2005), land-use and land-cover change (Parker et. al, 
2003), technology diffusion, resource use changes and policy analysis (Berger, 2001), 
and residential land use patterns (Irwin and Bockstael, 2002).  
This wide range of applications for MAS models shows its high potential in 
handling the real-world complexities and as such qualifies it as an ideal candidate to 
represent a framework for modeling interactions among the homeowners and other 
agents during the post disaster recovery process.  
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6.3. MAS-MODEL STRUCTURE AND SPECIFICATIONS 
In this section, the structure of the MAS model is presented in 4 sequential subsections. 
The first subsection named as import-world module, elaborates on the multi-agent 
framework chosen for the model and extends on how real world data was imported into 
this framework. To illustrate the process, a neighborhood in College Station, Texas is 
selected and is subsequently used to show model sensitivity to both theoretical and 
empirical models, and initial parameters. The second subsection presents the details of 
homeowners’ decision making structure for both spatial and organizational domains and 
is named as agent-setup module. This is succeeded by the third subsection named as run 
module, which controls the details regarding each run of the simulation by incorporating 
the temporal and organizational aspect of recovery. Finally the last subsection illustrates 
the methods used to capture emergent spatial phenomena such as formation of clusters 
resulting from agents’ interactions and was described as cluster module. 
 
6.3.1.  “import-world” Module 
The multi-agent framework chosen for this dissertation was Netlogo (Wilensky, 1999). 
Netlogo started as StarlogoT in 1997 by Uri Wilensky and was named as Netlogo in 
2002. Netlogo is a Java-based multi-domain multi-agent framework and has been used to 
capture the complexity of a variety of topics in the literature. This include population 
variation (BenDor et al. 2009), financial market (Dréau et al. 2009), green house effect 
(Shultz 2009), infection and epidemic dynamics (Kleczkowski and Maharaj 2010) and 
forest fire simulation (Niazi 2010).  
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One of the great advantages of multi-agent frameworks such as Netlogo is their 
ability to model spatial aspects of the problem. This plays a crucial role in the context of 
recovery dynamics where the recovery is significantly linked to the distribution of 
agents’ location around the source of the disaster or its focal point. For the purpose of 
this dissertation, the same feature was used to import the real conditions to the simulated 
model.  
There are two ways to import location data in Netlogo. In the first, the program 
detects subjects based on their color. This makes it easier for programming but at the 
same time impedes its applicability for the cases where there are a wide range of 
gradient colors and the cases where a color is shared among different subjects. In 
contrast to the first approach, the next method is based on using the GIS extension of the 
program. This extension enables the model to import GIS data in two forms of data files, 
which are ascii grid file and shape files. Ascii grid files include raster data whereas 
shape files include vector data such as points, lines and polygons (Wilensky 1999). The 
disadvantage regarding the second approach is its shortcoming in the types of imported 
data. This shortcoming can be attributed to the fact that the software is incapable of 
importing data from Google Earth© which is one of the most popular mapping software 
and browser.  
Programs such as Google Earth© provide users with universal GIS data. 
However, this data cannot be saved as compatible formats with Netlogo. The outputs 
from Google Earth© have another file format named as Keyhole Markup Language 
(KML) which is the Extensible Markup Language (XML) form of the graphical data for 
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the use in maps and map browsers. To address this shortcoming, a KML to shape file 
convertor (Zonum Solutions 2011) was used to convert data from KML extension to 
shape files that are usable in Netlogo framework. This enabled the model to benefit from 
the integrated features in Google Earth© such as pinpointing the targets and drawing 
polylines and polygons. The steps taken to import geographical information in Netlogo 
is described below for a selected neighborhood in College Station, Texas. Figure 6-1 
shows this area. 
 
Figure 6-1. Area selection in Google Earth
©
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After area selection, the next step was to pinpoint targets (homes) and draw the 
polylines (streets) to import them as points and lines in the model. This step was 
performed using Google Earth© features and is shown in Figure 6-2 and Figure 6-3. 
 
 a) aerial map 
 
b) aerial map with points 
 
Figure 6-2. Aerial map with points 
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Figure 6-3 displays the added polylines to the area in Google Earth© that 
characterized the streets for model simulation.  
 
Figure 6-3. Aerial map with points and polylines 
After defining targets (homes) and polylines (streets), the next step was to import 
the data in Netlogo modeling framework. The importing procedure was accomplished by 
performing different subroutines and functions, list of which is shown in Figure 6-4 
below. As shown in the figure, homes were detected as black dots whereas the streets or 
other infrastructure were distinguished as black polylines.  
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Figure 6-4. Imported area in Netlogo framework 
In this figure, subroutines, functions, and controllers for each module known as 
programming components (PC) are presented. These programming components are 
separately illustrated for each module in their corresponding subsection. For the import-
world module these components are listed in Figure 6-5. 
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SUB import-world 
     import-drawing 
     import-points 
     import-paths 
     detect-paths (as patches) 
     clear-drawing 
END 
------------------------------------------------------- 
FUNCTION import-drawing 
     load(aerial-photo) 
END 
------------------------------------------------------- 
FUNCTION import-points 
     connect(points-database) 
     define j = 0 
     set i number of points in database 
     while j <= i  
     load(i) 
     j = j + 1 
END 
------------------------------------------------------- 
FUNCTION import-paths 
     connect(paths-database) 
     define j = 0 
     set i number of points in database 
     while j <= i  
     load(i) 
     j = j + 1 
END 
------------------------------------------------------- 
FUNCTION detect-path (as patches) 
     ask patches if [intersect(patch,path)] = true 
     [set patch as path] 
END 
Figure 6-5. “import-world” pseudo code 
After successfully importing the geographical data in Netlogo, The next step is to 
identify each agent and assign its properties. This is the objective of the next subsection. 
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6.3.2. “setup-agent” Module 
The goal of this simulation step is to setup homeowners’ decision-making structure and 
characterize a hypothetical case of a disaster. This was followed by defining variables 
that were previously introduced for both the theoretical and empirical models and was 
accomplished through a series of actions, 1) define the source of disaster, 2) characterize 
the points as homeowners by assigning them a decision-making structure for both 
theoretical and empirical models, and 3) assign proper level of damage to both homes 
and infrastructure based on their distance from the source of disaster. These are shown in 
Figure 6-6. 
 
  
Figure 6-6. Characterized model in Netlogo 
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Parameters modeled in Figure 6-6 are the same as those resulted from the data 
used in spatial experiment in Section 4. According to the experiment results, 
homeowners’ reconstruction decision is significantly associated with three variables 
which are: 1) the ratio of available funds to reconstruction costs; 2) percent of damages 
in the neighborhood which was categorized into two categories of below and over 50 
percent of damages by using different icons; and 3) availability of infrastructure which 
was classified in three groups of not available, available in three month and available, by 
using different color codes. 
Therefore the sequence of events in this subsection is as follow, initially the 
disaster took place in the area and affected both homeowners and infrastructure. 
Subsequent to this incident, homeowners are assigned a signal value, which is indicative 
of their future property value if they reconstruct. The range of the signal value and its 
precision together with homeowners’ initial property value and discount factor are 
among the control simulation set-up parameters defined in this module.   
At the same time, homeowners start bargaining with insurance companies to 
secure funds for future reconstruction. This bargaining procedure is approached by both 
theoretical and empirical models. This is then followed by defining neighborhood for 
each homeowner. This allows for updating beliefs in homeowners regarding the mean of 
property values in the neighborhood and their own future properly value. The parameter 
denoting the radius of each homeowner’s neighborhood can also be set by the last 
control parameter in this module. These steps are shown in Figure 6-7.  
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SUB setup-agent 
     disaster 
     setup-homeowner 
END 
------------------------------------------------------- 
FUNCTION disaster 
     damage(infrastructure) 
     damage(homeowners) 
END 
------------------------------------------------------- 
FUNCTION damage(i) 
     if i=infrastructure [set category] 
     if i=homeowners [set percent-damage] 
END 
------------------------------------------------------- 
FUNCTION setup-homeowner 
     assign(signal, precision) 
     assign(insurance) 
     assign(neighbor) 
     assign-belief 
END 
------------------------------------------------------- 
FUNCTION assign-belief 
     set-belief(mean-future-property-values) 
     set-belief(own-future-property-value) 
END 
Figure 6-7. “setup-agent” pseudo code 
After setting up the belief structure for homeowners, the next part is to simulate 
their actions based on the existing conditions in the area. This is the objective of the next 
subsection. 
 
6.3.3. “run” Module 
This module captures the temporal behavior of homeowners including the way they 
update their beliefs at each time step during the recovery process. As previously 
mentioned, two approaches were integrated in the model to capture the spatial and 
organizational interactions of agents. In the theoretical-spatial model, homeowners’ 
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behavior is based on the concepts of game theory and their mixed reconstruction 
strategy, whereas in the empirical-spatial model this behavior is a function of 
homeowners’ available funds versus cost of reconstruction, percent of damages in the 
environment and availability of infrastructure. Similarly for the organizational domain, 
the theoretical model is based on bargaining theory whereas the empirical model 
captures the results from the experimental study. Agents’ decisions in each of these 
approaches relies on their beliefs at the time of simulation which is updated in every 
time step using this module.  
Furthermore to generate hybrid models, a parameter was defined to assign 
weights to each model. The sequence of events for each run of the model is as follows: 
1) homeowners observe the current conditions in the area and update their beliefs 
accordingly; and 2) homeowners calculate their probability of reconstruction based on 
their updated beliefs and act respectively. This is shown in details in Figure 6-8.  
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SUB run 
Loop 
[     
     I = I + 1:I = total number of agents [stop]  
     select agent:select neighbor 
-----------Reconstruction Strategy based on Experiment----------- 
     Log(P(W)|P(R))=f(r2,pd,ai) 
     Log(P(L)|P(R))=f’(r2,pd,ai) 
     Calc-P(R) (Probability of Reconstruction)  (EQUATION 4-33 & 4-34) 
     Calc-P(W) (Probability of Wait)        (EQUATION 4-33 & 4-34) 
     Calc-P(L) (Probability of Leaving)         (EQUATION 4-33 & 4-34) 
-----------Reconstruction Strategy based on Theory--------------               
     [Update-Belief agent(Signals Only) 
     if neighbor.reconstruct = true then 
     [Update-Belief agent](Signals & Real values) 
     endif                                   
     Calc-EVI (Immediate) 
     Calc-EVW (Waiting) 
     Calc-P(R) [reconstruct] [wait] (EQUATION 4-16) 
-----------Bargaining Strategy based on Theory--------------               
     Calc-Eq(offer) (SUBSECTION 5-2-3) 
-----------Bargaining Strategy based on Experiment--------------               
     Calc-b1 (expected payoff first round) (EQUATION 5-1) 
     Calc-b2 (expected payoff counteroffer) (EQUATION 5-2) 
     T= T + 1                                                                          
] 
END 
Figure 6-8. “run” pseudo code 
6.3.4. “cluster” Module 
The first three subsections addressed how the micro-level objectives of this dissertation 
were incorporated in the multi-agent environment. The last subsection will focus on the 
macro-level objective of this dissertation. Therefore, the objective of this subsection is to 
create a feature in the multi-agent framework, which can detect any emergent 
phenomena such as spatial cluster formation. 
For the purpose of recovery pattern recognition, two clustering algorithms were 
proposed: 1) Density Based Spatial Clustering of Applications with Noise (DBSCAN) 
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proposed by Ester et al. (1996); and 2) Clique algorithm. The results from both 
algorithms were contrasted to each other to identify the best algorithm for the purpose of 
this dissertation. 
 
6.3.4.1. DBSCAN clustering algorithm  
DBSCAN is one of the most frequent clustering algorithms cited in the literature with 
the ranking of 22nd in the field of data mining (Microsoft 2010). In this algorithm, the 
main idea behind detecting clusters is that for each point of a given cluster, the 
neighborhood with a given radius must have at least a given number of members. 
Therefore a cluster can be characterized by two key parameters: 1) Neighborhood, which 
is the neighboring area within a given radius; and 2) Minimum points, which are the 
minimum number of points that must exist within a cluster.  
Based on these definitions, three classifications are illustrated founded on the 
concept of points reachability, which are: 1) Directly Density Reachable, which is the 
case where a point exists within the neighborhood of another point and that point 
satisfies the minimum points criterion for clusters; 2) Density Reachable, in which a 
point is not directly reachable by another point but is reachable through a set of 
intermediate directly reachable points; and 3) Density Connected, which is the case 
where two points are neither directly density reachable nor density reachable but are 
density reachable to a single common point (Ester et al. 1996).   
Now, according to these definitions, a cluster is a set of density-connected points 
which is maximal with regard to density reachability. The pseudo code of this algorithm 
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is shown in Figure 6-9, in which D  is the set of points, eps  is the radius defining the 
neighborhood, and MinPts  is the minimum amount of points required to form a cluster 
(Ester et al. 1996).  
  
FUNCTION DBSCAN(D, eps, MinPts) 
   C = 0 
   foreach point P in D if P.flagged = False 
   set P as flagged 
   N = countNeighbors (P, eps) 
      if size(N) < MinPts 
         set P as NOISE 
      else 
         set C as New(cluster) 
   checkCluster(P, N, C, eps, MinPts) 
END 
------------------------------------------------------           
FUNCTION checkCluster(P, N, C, eps, MinPts) 
   cluster(C) = cluster(C) + P 
   foreach point Q in N  
   if Q.flagged = False  
         set Q as visited 
         M = countNeighbors(Q, eps) 
   if sizeof(M) >= MinPts 
            set N = N + M 
   if Q.ismemberofCluster = False  
            cluster(C) = cluster(C) + Q 
END 
Figure 6-9. DBSCAN pseudo code 
6.3.4.2. Clique algorithm  
The goal of clique algorithm is to find a set of complete sub-graphs within a graph that 
satisfies a certain criterion. The clique algorithm was initiated by Luce and Perry (1949) 
who used it in social networks and to find people who all know each other, and became 
very popular afterwards.  
99 
 
In this algorithm, the research problem is modeled as a connected graph ( , )G V E  
that consists of a set of vertices V and a set of unordered pairs, called edges E . Cliques 
are any subsets of vertices T  in G  where any pair of vertices forms an edge in G . Then 
the objective is to detect the maximum and maximal cliques. Maximal cliques are those 
that cannot be extended by including any more adjacent vertices, while maximum 
cliques are the ones with maximum number of vertices. For the purpose of this research, 
the vertices represent the reconstructed homeowners and the edges denote the distance 
between any pair of homeowners. In this subsection, the objective was not to detect 
maximal or maximum cliques but to find the number of homeowners who were a part of 
a clique with size of n , where n denotes the minimum number of homeowners. The 
following pseudo code displays how this algorithm was integrated in the multi-agent 
system. As shown in Figure 6-10, for every point in each sub-graph, the criteria of 
forming a clique of size n  are checked, and therefore the results are optimal by brute 
force, in which all possible candidates for problem solutions are checked.  
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SUB clique 
   dim D 
   dim K(D)
 
   D = set of homeowners 
   foreach point P in D if P.reconstructed 
   foreach point M in neighbor-radius point P 
   if M.reconstructed 
   create a link from P to M 
   set K(P)=K(P)+M 
   next 
   next 
   checkClique(P,K(P),no-clique) 
END 
------------------------------------------------------           
FUNCTION checkClique(P,K(P),no-clique) 
   dim N 
   foreach point N in K(P) 
   foreach point L in K(N) 
   if point L is a member of K(K(P)) 
   set sum(N) = sum(N) + 1 
   next 
   next   
   foreach point D in K(P) 
   if sum (D) >= no-clique 
   set D member of Clique(P,K(P),no-clique) 
END 
Figure 6-10. Clique pseudo code 
6.3.4.3. Evaluation of cluster-detection algorithms 
In this part, the objective is to contrast the aforementioned algorithms. To accomplish 
this task the MAS model was used for a new case study. The case study was related to a 
region affected by Kobe earthquake in Nagata area by Maki et al. (2007). The area was 
imported in Netlogo by detecting the regions based on their colors. Figure 6-11 shows 
the original and the imported maps converted to the grayscale format. Since in the 
original photo the exact number of properties was not specified, in the simulated model 
for each colored region, properties with equal distance from each other were 
automatically created. The next step was to assign proper level of damage to each 
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homeowner. This was performed by the color coding on the original map in which red 
showed major damage, yellow was moderate, blue indicated no damage, green was 
slight damage, pink was burned out, and white showed no information. 
 
a)original (Maki et al. 2007) 
 
b)edited 
 
c)imported in Netlogo 
Figure 6-11. Case study – Kobe earthquake 
Although the multi agent model developed here has its own simplifications, the 
goal was to examine its ability to capture the major concepts. After defining the model, 
both clustering algorithms were applied to the model. Figure 6-12 shows the results from 
a single run of the model for the Kobe case study.  
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Figure 6-12. Comparison of the two cluster-detection algorithms 
In this case study, the figures on the left are all identical and represent the initial 
phase of the study. The black squares denote the properties that have been reconstructed. 
The neighborhood defined for each property is shown by the drawn circle on the figure. 
The case was tested for different scenarios in which the neighborhood radius was kept 
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the same and the minimum acceptable properties to form a cluster, was changed. This 
number was changed from a minimum of three to a maximum of five.  
In Figure 6-12, the second column shows the results from application of the 
clique algorithm, whereas the third column shows the results for DBSCAN algorithm. 
Although there exist similarities between the two methods, Clique algorithm being 
optimal, shows a better coverage of properties that are believed to form a cluster 
compared to the DBSCAN algorithm and, as such, was selected as the preferred cluster-
detection algorithm in this dissertation. This is clearly shown in Figures 6-12-b1 and 6-
12-b2.  
 
6.3.4.4. Hypothesis testing 
After selection of clique algorithm as the preferred cluster detection method for this 
research, the algorithm was used for Kobe case study to examine the level of 
significance of cluster formation in the model. This required developing a null 
hypothesis for the model. The proposed null hypothesis would have to be a certain 
percentage for cluster formation. Consequently performing the statistical procedure 
shows whether the percentage of cluster formation is significant assuming the proposed 
confidence level. 
The hypothesis testing was formulated using a minimum rate of cluster-
formation. This minimum rate was set to be 50 percent of reconstructed properties. 
Hence, accepting the alternate hypothesis would indicate that clustering in reconstruction 
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occurs more than 50 percent of the time. Assuming normality and unknown variance for 
the population, a  t-statistic was used for the test: 
0
0 0 1 0 0 0 , 1: ,  : ,  ,  
/
n
X
H H T t t
S n

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where 
0H  is the null hypothesis, 1H  is the alternative hypothesis, 0T  is the test statistic, 
and 0t is the rejection criterion. Since the t statistic is bigger than the rejection criterion, 
the hypothesis of having a cluster formation equal to 50% is rejected and the alternative 
hypothesis is accepted. This denotes that the rate of cluster formation is higher than 
50%.  Table 6-1 shows the results. 
Table 6-1. Results from t  test 
 t P-value 
Low 
Interval 
High 
Interval 
T test for 
0.5   3.7438 2.375E-4 0.5452682 0.6460363 
 
Based on the estimated p-values, it can be concluded having a level of cluster 
formation higher than 50 percent is statistically significant base on a 95% confidence 
level. Furthermore the confidence interval for the mean lies within the range of 
[0.5452,0.646].  
6.4. MODEL VALIDATION  
Model validation in simulation models in general and social dynamics models in 
particular is an inherently difficult task and a point of disagreement among the 
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researchers. The contradiction lies in the very essence of the modeling philosophy, 
should models be the representative of the reality – as exists or built in future, or should 
models be purpose-driven and focus on authenticity rather than statistical results 
(Sterman, 2000). In this subsection, the goal is to pursue both approaches and strike the 
balance between the parsimony and accuracy.  
To examine the robustness of the model, a series of sensitivity analyses was 
performed. These analyses started with the theoretical model by testing its reconstruction 
sensitivity to a set of parameters, such as: 1) accuracy of signals through coefficient of 
variation; and 2) economic parameters, such as discount factor. The base model was 
assumed to have a discount factor of 0.9, coefficient of variation of 0.5, neighbor radius 
of 4, initial value of $250K. Since discount factor and coefficient of variation were 
separately defined just for the theoretical approach of the spatial model, the following 
sensitivity analyses were performed for that specific part of the model. 
To accomplish the task, two values were considered for each parameter. For 
discount factor these values were 0.9 and 0.5, whereas for coefficient of variation these 
values were 0.5 and 2.  The logic behind these selections was that each represents an 
extreme for that parameter. For example, the discount factor of 0.5 indicates a high 
discounting which is in contrast to the discount factor of 0.9. On the other hand, the 
coefficient of variation of 2 denotes a high level of variance, which is in contrast to the 
coefficient of variation 0.5. The results from the simulation were depicted in Figure 6-
13. Explanation of the results is separately shown for each parameter. 
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Figure 6-13. Model sensitivity to discount factor and coefficient of variation 
6.4.1. Sensitivity to Coefficient of Variation 
The first feature of the model is its sensitivity to accuracy of signals through coefficient 
of variation (CofV). As previously stated, a higher CofV indicates that the signal is a 
poor indicator of the true future value or in other words, denotes a high variance 
associated with the value.  
The results show that given a fixed discount factor of 0.5, the reconstruction rate 
decreases as the level of uncertainty for the signals increases. This is clearly shown for 
the two sets of curves shown in Figure 6-13. The first two curves have a triangle marker 
whereas the other two have a rectangle marker. This is due to the fact that homeowners 
decide based on their observed signals from their surrounding neighbors. The accuracy 
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of these signals is inversely proportional to their variance. Therefore with increasing 
variance (uncertainty), owners become more hesitant in starting reconstruction and 
prefer to wait and observe other neighbors’ action to guarantee a positive net value for 
reconstruction.  
 
6.4.2. Sensitivity to Discount Factor 
The next characteristic of the model is its sensitivity to the level of discounting. The 
results show that given a fixed CoV, reconstruction rate increases as discount factor 
(DF) increases. This is again shown in for the two sets in Figure 6-13 displayed as full 
lines and dash lines. 
The reason behind this behavior is that discount rate is one of the driving 
parameters in the process of decision making. Applying a high discount rate to the 
present value calculations assigns more weight to the current payoffs compared to 
payoffs anticipated in the future. Therefore one expects to observe an increase in the 
number of reconstructing owners by increasing the discount rate and vice versa. It is 
assumed that all the homeowners have the same discount rate. 
 
6.4.3. Theoretical Model versus Hybrid and Empirical Model 
The third sensitivity analysis was to contrast the different models to check for their 
effect on the rate of reconstruction. These different models consist of, 1) Theoretical 
model, 2) Empirical model, and 3) Hybrid model. For the hybrid model the assumption 
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was to consider an equal weight for both theoretical and empirical models. The results 
from simulation is shown in Figure 6-14. 
 
Figure 6-14. Sensitivity analysis for different models 
For the purpose of simulation, a discount factor of 0.5 and a coefficient of 
variation of 0.5 was considered for the model. The results shown in Figure 6-14, denotes 
that the reconstruction rate in the empirical model has a very limited dispersion. This is 
due to the fact that in the empirical model, reconstruction decisions is based on three 
parameters which are: 1) ratio of available funds to reconstruction costs ( 2r ); and 2) 
percent of damages in the neighborhood and availability of infrastructure. Among these 
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parameters, the availability of infrastructure does not change and as a result will not 
contribute to the variability of the reconstruction rate. On the other hand 2r  which is the 
only parameter that is directly affected by the assumed discount factor, is not as 
significant as the other two variables in the model. Therefore it is expected to have an 
almost constant rate of reconstruction for the empirical model. The other important issue 
shown in the figure is the substantially higher rate of reconstruction for empirical model 
in contrast to the theoretical model. This result is attributed to the fact that in the 
empirical model, the probability of reconstruction significantly increases by availability 
of infrastructure and percent of damage in the area. In the model used for simulation, 
almost half of the home owners have a damage level of less than 50 percent and are in 
vicinity of either available infrastructure or semi-available infrastructure. These 
parameters significantly contribute to the high rate of reconstruction in the empirical 
model. 
In addition, the hybrid model exhibits the characteristics of both empirical and 
theoretical model. As shown in Figure 6-14, the level of dispersion has increased 
compared to the empirical model which is due to including the equal weight for both 
models. The rate of reconstruction is still higher than the theoretical model which is 
inherited from the empirical model. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.1. CONCLUSIONS 
Modeling the dynamics of post-disaster recovery can play an important role in providing 
public decision makers with analytical tools and methods to analyze policies that can 
promote fast recovery of the affected areas. To restore the community on a level of a 
functional socio-economic entity it is essential that policy makers and homeowners send 
signals of strong commitment. Without this, the reconstruction is often sporadic as 
spatial and information externalities dominate decisions to reconstruct and stay, or sell 
the property and leave. 
This dissertation presents a multi-domain behavioral model that captures the 
homeowners’ behavior when spatial externalities are present. The multi-domain 
considered for this model includes: 1) spatial domain of interaction in which the 
behavior of homeowners while interacting with each other was presented; and 2) 
organizational domain of interaction which analyzed the behavior of homeowners while 
interacting with insurers to secure funding for reconstruction.  
A two-pronged approach was utilized, capturing the spatial and organizational 
externalities in this research. Regarding the spatial externality, the first approach was 
based on a theoretical approach to the existence of spatial externality which led to the 
free-rider problem. This results in the situation where homeowners may prefer to wait 
and observe the neighbors’ actions rather than starting the reconstruction. As a result, the 
homeowners were assumed to have two pure strategies, which are: 1) immediate 
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reconstruction; and 2) wait and observe the neighbors’ action and act accordingly. 
Additionally from empirical approach this decision making is made based on a 
confluence of parameters such as availability of infrastructure, percent of damage in the 
area and financial flexibility of the homeowners. In this dissertation, the solution for 
theoretical part was approached through a mixed strategy equilibrium, where 
homeowners are indifferent between their strategies when the payoffs are the same. In 
addition, the solution for the experimental method was addressed through logistic 
regression modeling.   
Regarding the organizational domain, the same set of approaches was applied to 
the model. The first approach was to capture the characteristics of homeowners’ 
bargaining behavior in their interaction with insurers from a theoretical point of view, 
whereas the next approach was to tackle this problem from an empirical perspective and 
by running an experiment. 
Based on the developed models, a multi-agent system simulation was developed 
to integrate these models and depict the emergent behavior.  In this multi-agent model, 
homeowners were defined as intelligent agents with a belief structure which is updated 
based on the signals from their neighbors.  
The results from simulation model confirm that spatial and organizational 
externalities play an important role in agents’ decision-making and can greatly impact 
the recovery process. The results further highlight the significant impact of discount 
factor and the accuracy of the signals on the percentage of reconstruction. Finally, 
cluster formation was shown to be an emergent phenomenon during the recovery process 
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and spatial modeling technique demonstrated a significantly higher impact on formation 
of clusters in comparison with experimental model and hybrid model. 
The model assumed that reconstruction could peak out at less than 100 percent. 
Therefore if the property-owners cannot secure a positive payoff from reconstruction, 
they will not reconstruct but effectively leave the location eventually.  
The issues deserving further attention are those which might have implications 
for policy holders. These include setting constraints for availability of funding in regards 
to reconstruction of residential units and transportation infrastructure, limiting the 
number of insured homeowners, optimizing the methods of resource allocation, 
incorporating the dynamics of the transportation infrastructure and others.  
 
7.2. LIMITATIONS 
As previously mentioned, this dissertation was intended to investigate the role of two 
key intelligent agents in the dynamics of post-disaster recovery and to capture the overall 
trend in post disaster reconstruction. While the number of affecting stakeholders could 
be much more than what has been considered, this research followed the principle of 
parsimony to clearly track the dynamics created in the system.  
This model does not attempt to fully explain a very complex post-disaster 
reconstruction process, nor to capture heterogeneity in owners’ behavior, but to provide 
a theoretical foundation for investigating the phenomenon of spatial cluster formation 
and decision-making under uncertainty.  
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It is also important to note that rezoning of the neighbors in abandoned areas and 
the impacts of other influencing parameters such as location, density, public policy, and 
others have not been considered in the model. Although the multi agent model 
developed here has its own simplifications, which include lack of heterogeneity of the 
agents, and availability of funds for reconstruction among others, it has an ability to 
capture the broad trends.  
 
7.3. CONTRIBUTIONS  
 
7.3.1. General Contributions 
The general contributions of this model are: 1) providing a platform to spatially model 
the agents and investigate the resulting interactions; and 2) providing a platform with a 
potential to observe the impact of public policies on dynamics of post disaster recovery. 
  
7.3.2. Engineering Contributions 
From the engineering viewpoint, the key contribution of this research is to provide a 
framework which facilitates infrastructure-management in the context of natural hazards. 
The capability of incorporating a variety of parameters in the MAS model developed for 
this research allows for studying the impact of integrating different reconstruction and 
resource allocation polices in the affected areas, which, in turn, will lead to optimizing 
the available resources. This could be done in the model by capturing the process of 
economic recovery in the community until a full socio-economic restoration is realized.  
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Economic recovery is a critical parameter facing communities affected by 
disasters. The economic losses after disasters do not occur instantly but accumulate over 
the duration of recovery. In other words, the immediate economic losses have a domino 
effect on other sources of economic viability in a community.  
For example, in Hurricane Katrina the economic losses other than those resulted 
from immediate destructions were due to: 1) damages to industry by disruption in the oil 
supply due to the destructions in oil refineries and platforms; 2) damages due to 
disruption in commerce attributable to the destruction of highway infrastructure in the 
Gulf Coast; 3) damages due to interruption in operation of US ports; and 4) damages due 
to job losses and businesses (United States Department of Commerce, 2006). Similar 
conditions were present for other natural disasters, such as the incurred economic losses 
in Des Moines, Iowa due to the closure of the water treatment plant and disruption of 
railroad traffic due to the damages to the flooded tracks; the economic losses suffered 
due to the collapse of Oakland Bay Bridge, which included the disruptions created by the 
destruction of major highway corridors; and the closure of local airport during the Loma 
Prieta earthquake. Furthermore, loss of tourism was also among one of the major sources 
for economic losses which were experienced in the affected communities, especially in 
Sun Belt (FEMA 421, 1998). 
Additionally, as shown in Figure 7-1, economic growth and recovery is among 
the three pillars of a sustainable design of engineering structures (Adams 2006) and 
together with public safety are the two driving factors for post disaster planning.  
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Figure 7-1. Three pillars of a sustainable design 
Therefore, the main idea behind this research was to provide engineers and 
researchers with a new platform, in which the influential parameters with regard to 
economic recovery of an affected area could be modeled. This will eventually result in 
better post-disaster planning, leading to enhanced economic viability, which, in turn, 
results in a sustainable design. 
Additionally, having an accurate knowledge of disasters’ ripple effect enables 
policy makers to contrast the effect of policies on the relative, not necessarily on the 
absolute basis to determine the policies that are relatively more effective for the recovery 
process when contrasted to the existing policies. This will also help decision makers to 
bring together the best technical with the best socially and politically acceptable 
solutions to create a set of policies that are acceptable to the relevant stakeholders and 
the public.  
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APPENDIX A  
INSTRUCTION TO PLAYERS-SPATIAL SURVEY 
Assume that you live in a neighborhood with similar house plans, and that your 
neighborhood has been recently affected by a hurricane. Your property together with a 
few number of properties in your neighborhood have been significantly damaged and not 
suitable for living. As a result you as well as your neighbors are forced to rent houses in 
another part of the town. 
You are about to make a decision what to do. You have three options; 1) to 
reconstruct your home immediately, 2) to wait six-months and see if any of your 
neighbors have reconstructed or not and reconsider reconstruction based on your 
observation, and finally 3) to take the insurance money and buy yourself a new house 
somewhere else in the town.  
You have no information about whether your neighbors will reconstruct or not but you 
can observe if they will, by waiting. If you are to reconstruct right away and no one else 
reconstructs there would be a significant chance that the value of your property will be 
less than the cost of repair. In contrast if they all reconstruct there would be a high 
chance of getting a property value much higher than your cost of repair. 
Common Assumptions 
 Your neighborhood is the subdivision in which you are located 
 It would cost you $1,500 per month to rent a house 
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Specific Assumptions 
No Specification Value* 
1 Your property value before damage  
2 Cost of a new property in other part of the town   
3 Your savings/mortgages   
4 Reimbursement from your insurance  
5 Your property cost of repair  
6 Your current (damaged) property value  
*Computer generated data (all values are in thousand dollars) 
 
 
Based on the specific assumptions described in Table 1 and the different 
conditions showed in Table 2, pick an action from the following available options and 
email it back: 
Different Options: 
1) Reconstruct your home immediately 
2) Wait for 6 months and observe your neighbors’ actions and decide accordingly 
3) Take the insurance money and buy yourself a house somewhere else in the town 
 
Condition 
Availability of 
Infrastructure 
In your neighborhood 
Percent of significantly 
damaged properties 
in your neighborhood 
What would you do? 
(either 1,2, or 3) 
1 Not Available Less Than 50%  
2 Available Less Than 50%  
3 Available in 3 months Less Than 50%  
4 Not Available More Than 50%  
5 Available More Than 50%  
6 Available in 3 months More Than 50%  
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APPENDIX B 
PROOF FOR EQUATIONS 4-2 AND 4-3 
Proof: The proofs for Equations 4-2 and 4-3 are elaborated below through a series of 
sequential steps. The proof starts with signal is  and then integrates all the signals: 
Given:  
( ) ( , 1)
( | ) ( , )
i
i i i i
f z N
f s z N z
 


 
Assuming independency among variables: ( , ) ( ) ( | )i i i i if z s f z f s z  
Marginal of is  is proportional to: 
2 21 1exp ( ) exp ( )
2 2
i ix s x dx 


   
      
   
  
Now expanding the equations will result in: 
 2 2 2
1 1
exp ( ) exp (1 ) 2( )
2 2
i i i i is x s x dx    


   
        
   
  
Completing the square: 
2
1
1
i i
i
i
s
x
 


 
  
  
  
2 2 2
2 2
1 1 1
exp ( ) exp ( ( ) )
2 2 1
1 1
exp (1 ) 2 ( ) ( )
2 1
i i i i
i
i i i i i
i
s s
x x s s dx
   

    



  
     
   
  
          

 
Taking the integral will result in (function of  ): 
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2 2 2 2 21 1exp ( ( 2 ))
2 1
i i i i i i
i
s s s     

 
     
 
 
Assuming independency of signals conditional on  results in following for all the 
signals: 
2
1 1
1
exp 2
2 1 1
N N
i i i
i ii i
s
K
 
 
  
  
        
   
This is proportional to: 
1
1
1
1
1
,
1
1
N
i i
N
i i i
N
ii i
i i
s
N

 
 





 
  
  
  
  



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APPENDIX C 
PROOF FOR EQUATIONS 4-4 AND 4-5 
Proof: similar to the previous part, derivations for Equations 4-4 and 4-5 are presented 
below in a series of sequential steps. For simplicity, the derivations are shown for 
1z  
which is the same for other iz s .   
Given: 1 1 1 1( , ,..., , , ) ( , ,..., , | )N N N Nm s z s z m s z s z 
 
Therefore: 
1 1
1
( , ,..., , , ) ( | ) ( | )
N
N N i i i
i
m s z s z f s z f z 

  
This is proportional to: 
2 2
1 1
1 1
exp ( ) exp ( )
2 2
N N
i i i i
i i
z z s 
 
   
      
   
   
Now integrating out 2 ,..., Nx x  will result in: 
2 21
1 1 1
2
2
2
2
1
exp ( ) exp ( )
2 2
1
... exp ( ) ( ) ...
2
N
i i i i N
i
z s z
z s z dz dz


 

   
      
  
 
      
 
 
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This is proportional to: 
2 2 21
1 1 1
2
2
2
1 1
exp ( ) ( ) exp ( 1)
2 2 2
1
... exp (1 ) 2 ( ) ...
2
N
i i i i i N
i
z s z N
z z s dz dz

 
  

   
        
  
 
      
 
 
 
This is now proportional to: 
2 2 21
1 1 1
2
1
1 1
exp ( ) ( ) exp ( 1)
2 2 2
( )1
exp
2 1
N
i i
i i
z s z N
s

 
 

   
        
  
 
 
 

 
Now to integrate out  : 
2 2 2
1
2 2
21 1 1 1 1
exp ( ) ( 1)
2 2 2 1 2 1
N N
i i
i ii i
s
z N

  
  
 
      
  
   
This is proportional to: 
2 2
1 1
2 2
* **
1 1 1
exp( )exp ( [ ( ) 2 ( )
2 2 1 1
N N
i i
i ii i
s
z N z

 
  
 
 
     
  
  
   
On the other hand derivation for part (*) of the bracket results in: 
1
2 2 2 1 1
1 1 1
* 1 (1 ) 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
N N N
i
i i ii i i
N
 
 
      
          
    
    
Similarly derivation for part (**) of the bracket results in: 
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1 1 1 1
2 1 1 1
** 
1 1 1 1
N N
i i i i
i ii i
s s s s   

    
   
   
   
Therefore the original formulation will be proportional to (by completing the square for 
 ): 
1
2 1 21 1 1 1
1 1 1
1
1 2
1 1 1 1
1
1
(1 )1 1
exp( )exp( ( (1 ) )( ) )
2 2 (1 )
( (1 ) )1
exp(
2 (1 )
z s
z
z s
  
  
 
  
 





  
     
 
  
 
 
Which is proportional to the following: 
1 2
2 21 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
( (1 ) )1 1
exp( ( ) ) exp( ) exp
2 2 2 (1 )
z s
z s z
   
 


   
      
  
 
This leads to: 
1
2 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 11 1
1 1
(1 )1 1
exp [ (1 ) 2 ( )]
2 (1 ) (1 )
s
z z s
  
 
   

 
  
     
    
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and finally it can be concluded that  it is proportional to: 
2
1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1
1 11 1 1
1 1 1
(1 )
(1 )1 1
exp 1
2 (1 ) 1 ( (1 ) )
s
s
z
  

 

    


  
    
   
                        
 This denotes that the distribution of 1 1| ,..., Nz s s  is normal with the following parameters: 
Mean: 
1
1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1 1
1 1
1
(1 )
(1 ) ( (1 ) ) (1 )
(1 )( (1 ) ) 11
1
(1 )
s
s
s s
  

       
  

 

  


  
  
        
    
  
  
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2
1 1 1 1 1
( (1 ) 1) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
(1 )( (1 ) 1) (1 ) (1 ) 1
s s s s            
      
        
  
      
 
Precision: 
2
1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1
(1 )(1 (1 )) (1 ) (1 )1
1
(1 ) 1 (1 ) 1 (1 )
     

     
     
   
     
 
 
 
  
133 
 
APPENDIX D 
PARAMETERS FOR ( )t t  DISTRIBUTION 
Calculating mean 
Starting with the original formulation 
-1
-1
[ ( ) ( ) ( (1 ) )]
( )
[ ( ) (1 ) ]
j j j j
j
t t x s
t t
t
   

 
  
 
 
 
Calculating the expectation of ( )t t   
-1
-1
( ) ( ) [ ] (1 )
[ ( )]
( ) (1 )
j j j j
j
t t E x s
E t t
t
   

 
  
 
 
 
Using Equation 4-4, will result in 
1 -1
-1
( ) ( ) [( ( ) )(1 ) ] (1 )
[ ( )]
(1 )
j j j j j j
j j
t t t s s
E t t
      

 
    
 
 
 
Therefore 
1
-1
[ ( ) ( ) ( )(1 ) ] [ ( ) ( )(1 ) ( )]
[ ( )] ( )
[ ( ) (1 ) ] [ ( )(1 ) 1]
j j
j j
t t t t t t
E t t t
t t
       
 
   
   
   
   
 
Calculating Precision 
Starting with the original formulation 
-1
-1
[ ( ) ( ) ( (1 ) )]
( )
[ ( ) (1 ) ]
j j j j
j
t t x s
t t
t
   

 
  
 
 
 
Calculating the variance for ( )t t   
-1 2
-1
Var[ ( )] Var [ ( ) (1 ) ] Var[ ]
( ) (1 )
j
j j
j
x
t t t x
t
  
 

 
      
   
 
Following Equation 4-5 
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-1 2
2
[1 ( )(1 )]
Var[ ( )] [ ( ) (1 ) ]
[ ( ) (1 ) ]
j
j
j
t
t t t
t
 
  
 

 
   
 
 
After simplifications 
2
1
Var[ ( )]
[ ( ) ( ) (1 )]j
t t
t t

  
 
 
 
And therefore precision ( )t t   can be shown as 
2( ) ( ) (1 )jt t     
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APPENDIX E 
SAS RESULTS-MULTINOMIAL REGRESSION FOR SPATIAL SURVEY 
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APPENDIX F 
INSTRUCTIONS TO PLAYERS-ORGANIZATIONAL SURVEY 
It is assumed that you as a car-owner have been involved in a car accident and your car 
has been totaled. You know that your car did not worth more than $10,000. This value is 
considered to be your Maximum Car Value or MCV. Now you are in the process of 
negotiation with your insurance company to maximize your payoff. The insurer on the 
other hand has an opposite goal which is to minimize its losses due to your claim. It is 
believed that the negotiation starts with insurer’s offer to you. In these settings, you will 
have three options to choose from which are: 1) accept the insurer’s offer, 2) reject and 
continue negotiation by offering the insurer your own price, and 3) reject and pursue 
your outside option which in this case will be the court. Similarly, the insurer has the 
option of either accepting or rejecting your offer. 
For simplicity it is assumed that the negotiation process will be performed in two 
steps where step 1 is insurer’s offer to you and step 2 is your offer to insurer. If at the 
end of the second step, no agreement is achieved, the case will be automatically referred 
to the court. The court is assumed to be the “fair” arbitrator.  
Assumptions 
1) The outcome of the court for you would be a random draw from the three following 
values: 0.7, 0.8, or 0.9 of the Current Value (CV) of your car. 
2) Current Value (CV) of your car is the discounted value of your car for each step that 
an agreement is not achieved. CV is computed by applying a discount factor of 0.9 for 
each disagreement step. 
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3) You are supposed to pay a fixed cost of $500 for each step that the agreement is not 
achieved for your commuting expenses or CE. The table below shows the process in 
detail: 
  
STEP 1: 
Insurer Offers 
Bargaining over 
MCV 
Disagreement 
You do not 
accept 
the offer 
STEP 2: 
You Offer 
Bargaining over 
CV= 0.9 * MCV 
Disagreement 
Insurance does 
not accept the 
offer 
COURT 
Bargaining 
over 
CV= 0.9*0.9 * 
MCV 
 
Insurer You Insurer You Insurer You Insurer You Insurer You 
I(1)* O(1)* n/a -CE* I(2) O(2) n/a -CE* 
I(3)  
I(4)  
I(5) 
O(3) 
O(4)  
O(5) 
*I(n)= Indicates insurer’s bargaining share in the nth round of the bargaining. 
*O(n)= Indicates car-owner’s bargaining share in the nth round of the 
bargaining. 
*CE= a fixed amount of $500 per every step that an agreement is not 
achieved. 
 
Your Assigned Role 
car-owner 
Instructions 
1) If you have been assigned the role of an car-owner then your insurer’s offer will be 
emailed to you. The email then asks for your decision regarding the insurer offer. This 
decision should either be 1) accept or 2) reject following your own offer, or 3) reject and 
refer it to the court. After receiving your insurer’s offer please make your decision from 
the options above and send it by email to me at: alinejat@tamu.edu.  
2) If you have been selected as an insurer, you are supposed to indicate your offers to 
each of your customers (which are either 10 or 11) by completing the following table 
and email it back to me at: alinejat@tamu.edu. Your offers will be received by your 
clients and the results will be emailed back to you. If they did not accept your offer and 
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named their own offer, you are supposed to indicate whether you accept their offer or 
prefer to go to the court. 
 
 
Client 
Number 
Your Offer 
Client’s 
Response  
Your Response 
 
1    
2    
3    
4    
5    
6    
7    
8    
9    
10    
11    
12    
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APPENDIX G 
SAS RESULTS-MULTINOMIAL REGRESSION FOR INSURER'S OFFER 
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APPENDIX H 
SAS RESULTS-LINEAR REGRESSION FOR OWNER'S COUNTEROFFER  
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APPENDIX I 
R RESULTS-BINOMIAL REGRESSION FOR INSURER'S RESPONSE 
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